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USSR REPORT

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No 4, Jul-Aug 86

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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ENGLISH SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 218-221

[Text] NEO-COLONIALIST DIVISION OF LABOUR

S.A. Bylinyak

The collapse of the colonial system brought about preconditions for the restructuring of the economic relations between former colonies and their imperial powers. But the perpetuation of the world capitalist economy has been producing a restraining effect upon this process. The interplay of these factors gave rise to neo-colonialist relations including those related to the international division of labour.

The article examines the neo-colonialist relations and distinguishes two periods, the first one starting from the collapse of colonialism to the mid-1960s, the second from the mid-1970s onward. It demonstrates two stages: a short spell preceding the crisis, and a space of time following the crisis from the mid-1970s onward. The article focuses attention on the problems and contradictions of the past decade pertaining to the neo-colonialist division of labour. It investigates into the export and industrial strategies of the developing countries, principles of organisation and activities of the "zones of free trade" which grant great privileges to locally-based TNCs. The contribution of these zones to the economic progress of developing countries, limited as it is, is based on the fierce exploitation of those employed at the TNCs-controlled enterprises.

Whereas until recently the policy of protectionism has been regarded as the sole threat as regards the industrial export of the developing world, today, the introduction of the labour-saving technology strips developing countries of their advantages based on the low level of wages. As to the comparative advantages on the international industrial division of labour, the new technology places the accent on the science and technology factors. The distinction between states advancing along the path of economic progress and those suffering setbacks will be in an ever greater degree subject to their adaptability to the new technology.

On the basis of the neo-colonialist division of labour the developing world is being dragged into an unequal international economic relationship. This

enhances the susceptibility of developing countries to the crises occurring in the centres of capitalism. All this became patently clear in the drastic fall of the rates of growth of the developing world in the 1980s and the crisis of indebtedness.

HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE VILLAGE AND ITS EVOLUTION

V.P. Kurbatov

The article deals with the changes in the Chinese agricultural policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The "Cultural Revolution" (1966-76) brought the Chinese village to the verge of catastrophe. As a result of leftist distortions the Chinese peasantry ceased its professional activity to a great extent, the agricultural production hardly ran ahead of birth rate, in rural areas masses at large were unable to eke out a living.

The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC of the 11th Convocation was followed by a series of reforms in the Chinese village. These reforms included a rise in the prices of agricultural and cottage industry produce, a cut in taxes, reestablishment and doubling in size of private plots of land, opening of co-operative markets.

These changes were accompanied by a modification of the structure of industrial teams and rural people's communes. A system of production responsibility establishing a link between the volume of production and the piece-meal payment came to be widespread in the village. The article examines various kinds of this system, its dynamics, the attitude of peasantry, regular workers and the government to it. In 1982 the family undertaking became a leading form of the agricultural production, i.e. peasant households were made fully responsible for the productive activity. Thus, in actual fact, collective production units were disbanded, and in conditions of collective land ownership a system of small-scale land owning with its peculiarities and drawbacks was revived in China.

The Chinese government holds the view that the introduction of the system of production responsibility will contribute to the maximization of the socialist collective economy, a leading role in which is ascribed to the principle of state planning. At the same time, steps were taken to promote individual farming. Individual farmers were allowed to buy tractors, motor-cars, trucks and machinery for the cottage industry. The duration of land tenancy was extended to more than 15 years. Accumulation of land by "skilled agriculturalists" was encouraged.

The introduction of the system of production responsibility produced a marked effect. The agricultural production went up, the income of the bulk of the peasants rose, the economic activity of peasants revived. All this, however, was achieved by resuming small-scale individual farming. Private ownership sentiments became rampant in the village, property stratification accelerated, new social tension built up. Today, the development of agriculture and means of its modernisation are being widely discussed in the country.

CIVIL AND MILITARY POLITICIANS IN NIGERIA: CONFRONTATION OR PARTNERSHIP?

V.E. Khanin

The article investigates into the "rotation of power" between professional politicians and high-ranking military officers, a distinctive feature of modern Nigeria. This phenomenon is a reflection of the peculiarity of the interaction of borrowed and indigenous institutions, standards and values.

It is the author's contention that this "changing guard" in power is evidence of a permanent social and political crisis of Nigeria. Hence, the problems pertaining to the relationship of the politicians and the military and the machinery of the "rotation of power" are of great interest.

The experience of Western Nigeria during the first period of the military intervention (from 1966 to 1979) proves that even during these years the politicians remained one of the main power groups in the country. This suggestion is substantiated by facts illustrating the activities of informal and formal groups and organizations of professional politicians during the military intervention. In spite of the ban on party politics these organizations became an important tool of exerting influence on the military administration both in Western Nigeria and throughout the country.

The article reaches the conclusion that, objectively, the politicians and the military were partners. This, however, by no means, excluded a possibility of conflicts between them. Both the military coups and the sharing of power with the politicians were but a strategem to keep up power.

INDIGENIZATION OF CATHOLICISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

I.V. Podberezskiy

The article deals with the adaptation of Catholicism to the culture of the Philippines by taking into account local peculiarities. The fact that Catholics in Asia, Africa and Latin America are not satisfied with the Catholic Church and its inability to offer solutions to peoples' anxieties made this adaptation necessary. Not to lose the confidence of believers the Second Vatican called upon local churches to widely use the indigenous cultural experience.

In the Philippines this policy manifested itself in a more tolerable attitude of the Church to the so-called folk Catholicism impregnated with elements of pre-Christian beliefs. In the 1960s the Church in the Philippines (J. Bulatao) put forward a concept of a "split-level Christianity." The latter admitted animistic elements in the religious consciousness of the people and launched an appeal to Christianise them. In the 1970s theologians (L. Mercado) went further and came up with an assertion that local beliefs alone were genuinely Christian and the faith introduced by the Spaniards was from the outset contaminated by elements of Godlessness which are inherent of Western culture.

Initially, the Vatican encouraged this policy and even promoted it for it believed that this adaptation would enhance the positions of the world Catholicism in the developing world. However, when the authority of the Western Churches was put into question, the Vatican took a stand vehemently opposing the policy of adaptation fearing that it might lead to the denial of the leading role of the Roman Catholic Church.

The response of certain religious circles of the Philippines to this stand was negative. It was also instrumental in elaborating some local versions of the theology of liberation.

LANGUAGE AS INTEGRATION FACTOR IN EASTERN COUNTRIES

Ye.A. Kondrashkina

The article is an attempt to probe into intra- and interstate integration processes in some Eastern countries and examine the role of the language as a major factor of integration.

Emphasising the distinction between the integration and consolidation, the article defines the intrastate integration. With a special reference to Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Afghanistan, the Arab countries and Iran it demonstrates the way various Eastern languages, once proclaimed a state or official language, differ in their function as a factor of integration with regard to political, ethnic and linguistic conditions.

The article notes the important position occupied by the system of education in the propagation of link languages. It also underlines the importance of the concept of one nation which conforms to the efforts to transform the language into a tool of intrastate integration.

MALE AND FEMALE DICHOTOMY IN AFRICAN MYTHOLOGY

V.B. Iordansky

The article investigates into the impact of the mythological ideas on the division of labour in the traditional African society. It is emphasized that each kind of labour made an individual engaged in it enter into a set pattern of a relationship with the forces of mythology and magic. At times, these relations grew into hereditary.

In the society, as a whole, the relations between the male and the female were subordinated to the "laws" governing, according to the archaic folk ideas, the global structure of the Universe with its contradictions (and unity) of the male and the female.

The article notes that setting the male against the female in the ancient African society was a way of bringing order into the chaos of inter-clan contradictions. The male social superiority, incidentally, was established by propagating the idea of an imperfect structure of the female individuality.

LITERARY COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST IN MEDIEVAL AGES

V.I. Braginsky

The article deals with the typology of the medieval literary process which took place within the framework of vast literary communities, or zones (Arab and Moslem, Indian and Southeast Asian, Chinese and Far Eastern). Each of these zones included a zone-building literature. Usually, the latter had its written tradition in the ancient period. The Arab literature knew no ancient period, nevertheless it was tantamount to the Chinese and Sanskrit literatures in its functions. Each zone had also several integrated literatures, which by and large had no written language in the ancient period.

The distinctive feature of the zone-building literature was its independent transformation during the transition from the ancient to the medieval period. The corporative feudal society was a social basis of a zone-building literature. Ideologically, it was based on the non-ethnic religions of a new type within the framework of which emerged the canon of religious texts. Apart from laying down the main aspects of the ideology of a zone-building literature, the canon provided with it a means of communication, a language of the canon. The reflection over the texts of the canon gave rise to the formation of a religious norm and self-consciousness of a zone-building literature. The latter took the form of a teaching in a written form about its system. The literary self-consciousness, including the teaching about the composition of the written literature in it, was an important part of this system. As a zone-building literature, the Chinese literature came into existence in the second to the sixth centuries, the Sanskrit in the third to the seventh and the Arab in the seventh to the ninth centuries. These centuries mark the initial stage of the emergence of zones, as a single whole.

The formation of an integrated literature was based on the experience of zone-building literature within a certain zone and had a transplantation of a complex of writings of a medieval zone-building literature in a language of the canon as its point of departure. After this came the "recension" of a certain zone-building literature which included transplanted writings and those created by an integrated literature but in the language and conforming to the rules of a zone-building literature. This was followed by the formation of an ethnic-language text of a respective integrated literature. The second stage of the evolution of a zone, as a single whole, falls on the period ranging from the end of the first millenium to the first centuries of the second millenium A.D.

The third stage of this evolution was characterized by the flourishing of integrated literatures and their getting closer to a zone-building literature in terms of type and standard of their artistic practice and literary self-consciousness. So as far as most of the integrated literatures are concerned, this stage falls on the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. It was the time of the weakening of the ties between zone-building and integrated literatures, transplantations were superseded by direct influence, in certain instances literary syntheses were formed.

SEMANTICS OF THE IDEAS OF "BEGINNING" AND "END" IN SINTO AND EARLY JAPANESE BUDDHISM

A.N. Meshcheryakov

The article deals with one of the aspects of the interplay of Buddhism and Sinto. This is a most interesting problem in the history of the Japanese culture. Usually, it is the role played by Buddhism in the system of state ideology that draws most of the attention. The article suggests that the genuine position of Buddhism can not be understood unless examined in a broader cultural context. To demonstrate this the article undertakes a semiotic analysis of the ideas of "the beginning" and "the end." It argues that "the beginning" in the Sinto interpretation and the "end" in the Buddhist understanding constitute universal system-building categories.

The article touches upon three aspects: existential (human life), subject-matter and historical (understanding of the historical process). Chronologically, the analysis covers the period from the 8th to the 12th century. The article examines "Manyoshi," "Nihon ryoki," "Ujo gokurakki," "Shoku nihongi," "Hokke genki," "Fudoki," "Kojiki," "Nihon shoki," "Gukansho" etc. It reaches the conclusion that the heightened attention of Sinto to the beginning of the world and the initial stages of phenomena, and that of Buddhism to eschatology and the final stages of various processes had its impact on numerous artifacts ranging from the composition of folklore and literary tales to the understanding of the historical processes.

ILIOS AND TROY. ORIGINS AND SOURCES OF THE HOMERIC EPICS

L.S. Kleyn

The discussion on the whereabouts of the Homeric Troy had been going on for two centuries until having taken an unexpected turn recently. Formerly, the subject of the discussion was the specification of cities identifiable with Troy, all of them in the Troad (the distance in question was a few kilometers). After the Schliemann's excavations at Hissarlik the debate focused on the identification of the layer of Hissarlik to which the besieged city belonged. Today, with the discovery of the cleavage between the defeat of Hissarlik and the supposed attack of the Achaeans (the VIIth and even the VIth strata of Hissarlik were destroyed long after the fall of the Mycenaean civilization), the location of Troy itself is called into question. At the same time, however, there are also data available in favour of such whereabouts.

Both the general pattern of the ancient history of the Asia Minor and the Aegean (from the late second to the early first millennia B.C.) and the understanding of the Homeric epics depend on the solution of this problem.

The solution offered by the article suggests that two different cities have been matched in the Homeric image of the besieged city. Originally, Ilios and Troy did not coincide. As only Ilios that has been found at Hissarlik. Troy is to be sought elsewhere. On the strength of this suggestion the

article assumes that legends regarding two different cities have been combined into one poem. This conclusion is based mainly on three arguments:

1. The sets of fixed epithets of these names are different and the difference is not determined by prosodic (metric) needs. The characteristics of Ilios correspond to Hissarlik whereas those of Troy do not;
2. In the Iliad there are books in which the term "Ilios" prevails, in the other ones "Troy" is especially frequent;
3. In the Hittite records Vilusa (Ilios) and Taruisa, or Troia (Troy), are two different though neighboring countries.

Troy was introduced into the Homeric epics later than Ilios and in due course it began to replace Ilios (various epic works supply the evidence of this). The historical city named Troy was located either to the east of Ilios, or in the Island of Lemnos where it coincided with Poliochni. In this case Trojans would be Lemnian Tyrsenoi, the ancestors of Etrusci.

The article also suggests that Alexander (Paris) is an early epic hero associated with Ilios (Alaksandus of the Hittite records) while Priamos is a late hero associated with Troy. This is substantiated by the quotas of the names used within formulas (name-plus-epithet formula) with respect to the simple use of the name: Alexander and Ilios--47 per cent each, Priamos and Troy--32 per cent each. Paris, the second name of Alexander, is of much later origin and is never used with epithet.

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PRC AGRICULTURAL REFORMS, INTERNAL DEBATES DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 14-23

[Article by V.P. Kurbatov: "The Evolution of a System of Production Responsibility in the Chinese Village"]

[Excerpts] In the middle of the 1970s the national economy of the PRC was in a state of disorganization. In describing the consequences of the ultra-leftist distortions, the CCP Central Committee ascertained: "The 'Cultural Revolution,' running from May 1966 to October 1976, inflicted the most serious failures and losses on our party, state and people since the time our republic was formed." (Footnote 1) (Resolution on Several Issues in the History of the Communist Party of China Since the Formation of the Peoples Republic of China (adopted unanimously at the 6th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, 11th Session 27 Jun 81).--HONGQI. 1981, No 13, p 12.) Many party and state figures in China note that the "ten years of chaos and confusion" put the economy on the brink of catastrophe.

An exceedingly difficult situation took shape in agriculture. Maoist agrarian policies brought its development to a standstill and condemned many millions of peasants to poverty and a half-starved existence. As a consequence of the universal dissemination of egalitarianism and unfounded restrictions and prohibitions, the Chinese peasantry became apathetic and lost their labor activeness. "At 27.3 percent of the productive agricultural entities, the collective income per capita totals less than 50 yuan a year... A hundred million peasants cannot even provide their own subsistence wage." (Footnote 2) (RENMIN RIBAO. 5 Nov 80.) The average annual collective income per capita across the country in 1978 was equal to 74.6 yuan (Footnote 3) (HONGQI. 1981, No 4, p 2.), that is, hardly exceeded 6.2 yuan a month, while according to the calculations of Chinese economists, 10 yuan a month, or 120 a year, were essential for the reproduction of the workforce. (Footnote 4) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 19.) In view of the decline in the labor activeness of the peasantry in the Chinese villages, where more than 300 million able-bodied people resided, a number of places suffered an acute shortage of manpower nonetheless. Over 26 years (1952-78), labor productivity in agriculture increased by only 2.7 percent. (Footnote 5) (HONGQI. 1983, No 5, p 15.) Over this period, meanwhile, the villages received additional manpower and a certain amount of modern production equipment. Whereas in 1952 cultivation

was based almost completely on manual labor and draft animals, in 1978 there were 557,000 large and average tractors and 1.37 million small ("hand") ones available, thanks to which mechanized plowing was carried out on almost 40 percent of all land cultivated. Some 84,000 large, medium and small reservoirs were created in the country; in the north there were more than 2 million wells with (electro)mechanical water feed for field irrigation, while in the south a network of electrified drainage and irrigation stations was in operation. The total capacity of irrigation equipment reached almost 66 million horsepower. As a result, the area under irrigation was roughly doubled and irrigation conditions improved. The consumption of electric power in agriculture was 25.3 billion kWh [kilowatt-hours], and that of chemical fertilizers (recalculated in current substances) was 8.7 million tons. The employment of modern means for combating agricultural pests and crop diseases increased many times over. The output of agricultural produce, and first and foremost food crops, barely exceeded population growth, and in places (Sichuan Province and others) even lagged it. (Footnote 6) (SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO. 1981, No 1, pp 30-34.)

In analyzing the reasons for the disastrous state of agriculture, Chinese authors single out in particular such an important fact as the violation of the economic interests of the peasantry, which was deprived of economic independence to a considerable extent. The execution of production measures (for example, this or that disposition of grains, plowing and sowing times, and the like) were not determined by the peasants themselves, but by decree from above. The people demanding their fulfillment were frequently incompetent and thereby bore no responsibility for errors. The peasants did not feel themselves to be owners of the land. "Under our social system," wrote the theoretical journal HONGQI, "there is no exploitation, the means of production are the property of the laborers themselves and in essence they cannot be estranged from it. If the democratic rights and interests of the laborers are not sufficiently guaranteed, however, and especially if they do not have full use of the means of production and the results of labor, the feeling arises among the people that production is not their own." (Footnote 7) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 20.) As a result of theoretical confusion, which was manifested most sharply in the Cultural Revolution, ascertains the Chinese author, "there arose fighting over distribution according to labor, property differentiation in the villages, and the income of the peasants began to be limited. Multi-sector economy and cottage industries were regarded as "capitalist remnants" that had to be chopped off, which led to a single-crop economy. As a consequence, incomes fell, expanded reproduction in agriculture was limited and commodity production went into decline." (Footnote 8) (Ibid., p 21.)

After the death of Mao Tse Tung and the elimination of the "Gang of Four" from the political arena, a new climate took shape in the country, and the possibility arose of objectively evaluating the state of agriculture and undertaking a series of steps to revive it. Some of the leadership, occupying ultra-leftist positions, felt it expedient to implement a transition to larger agricultural production associations. This goal was affirmed in the PRC Constitution adopted in March of 1978, where the necessity of a gradual conversion from the production team, which represented, as a rule, the principal economic unit of accountability, to a larger team with the same

functions was discussed, which, in the opinion of some, would be a step forward on the path of the further collectivization of agriculture.

The 11th Session of the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, which commemorated the transition to a more sober policy in the sphere of agriculture, was held in December of 1978. (Footnote 11) (Zhan Wu, Liu Wenpu. The Third Plenum of the CCP CC Opened a New Path of Development for the Agriculture of China.--HONGQI. 1982, No 17, pp 17-21.) In essence, this plenum laid the foundation for the development of a new agrarian policy of the CCP. At first, however, the discussion concerned only some, if substantial, changes in the activity of agricultural production associations, wherein extremely differing points of view were expressed. There was actually as yet no unity either in the central leadership of the CCP or in the party leadership of the various provinces on issues of agricultural policy.

After the Third Plenum, a series of measures was carried out that improved the situation of the peasant masses. Prices were raised for some agricultural and cottage-industry products, taxes were lowered, work was strengthened on granting credit and on centralized procurement, cottage industries were permitted and became more active, and private plots were increased and were restored where they had been abolished. Cooperative markets were opened, independence and the right of ownership in a collective economy were respected, production teams were permitted to utilize land in accordance with its quality, and the development of a multi-sector economy was encouraged. (Footnote 12) (HONGQI. 1982, No 17, p 17.)

In the villages, they set about changing the organizational structure of production teams and people's communes. A system of production responsibility arose linking the volume of production with wages, which, in the opinion of a number of Chinese leaders, should facilitate the rehabilitation of labor activeness and the initiative of the rural population. "For many years," noted Du Runshen, at the time deputy chairman of the PRC State Committee on Agricultural Affairs, "the peasants have cultivated private plots and have obtained extremely good economic results. The question arises: Could the peasantry have the same concern for collective production as for personal production? Of course, it is unrealistic to demand that the peasants contribute the same amount of resources and labor and produce the same amount on public land as they do on private plots. But to act so as to make the peasants concerned about social production as they do about personal production--that can be hoped for. The current incorporation of a system of production responsibility can resolve this task to a certain extent." (Footnote 13) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 20.)

The idea of a system of production responsibility was advanced as early as the 1950s; it was relatively widely implemented in practice beginning in 1960, after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward." In some provinces (Anhui, Fujien), small workers' groups and individual peasant farms concluded contracts with production teams for the fulfillment of certain tasks (fattening pigs, cultivating a number of industrial crops) for which they received an established amount of labor units. At the end of the year, these units were paid for in cash, and all of the products obtained beyond the amount stipulated in the contract were retained by the peasants. In February

of 1962, this system was subjected to criticism, and during the Cultural Revolution was judged to be a "revisionist line of Liu Xiaoji" and eliminated. (Footnote 14) (HONGQI. 1980, No 19, p 27; Asian Survey. Vol 23. Berkley, 1983, No 7, p 880.) "Thus, a blow was inflicted on broad segments of the team workers who had sought a form of economic mechanism in the village and the traditional practice of treating everyone alike took shape." (Footnote 15) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 21.)

In 1977-78 certain provinces (Anhui, Fujien), with the permission of local party organs, began resurrecting the system of production responsibility. Targets, chiefly for secondary sectors and for the cultivation of minor crops, were issued not only to production teams, as was practiced beginning in 1962, but to even smaller worker groups (links, created by the peasants themselves). This had obvious results, and after the Third Plenum the Chinese leadership sanctioned several types of production-responsibility systems. Upon the instructions of the central powers, beginning in 1979 the collective means of production (land, livestock, agricultural implements) and some economic rights were conferred upon small worker groups or certain individuals.

The new agrarian policies, especially in the formulation process, encountered serious opposition in both the central and outlying areas. A broad discussion developed in the country, in the course of which directly opposing points of view were expressed. "Differences of opinion relative to these policies exist at all levels of the political and bureaucratic system," wrote American sinologist D. Zweig, the author of research on the incorporation of the system of production responsibility in PRC agriculture and the opposition to it. "Differences exist among the national elite, the intellectuals, between the rich provinces and the party center, between rich and poor regions, and between the bureaucracy and the peasantry in various localities." (Footnote 16) (Asian Survey. Vol 23, 1983, No 7, p 884.) Many leaders putting the reform into practice were not always ready to accept the changes occurring in agriculture at the beginning of the 1980s. Thus, in an article on the realization of the CCP agrarian policies, Wan Li, at the time the first secretary of the party committee of Anhui Province, came out categorically against the "so-called Bao-Chan Dao-Hu system," when the production targets were conveyed to peasant farms or, as they are given to say today, "the family form of conducting agriculture." (Footnote 17) (RENMIN RIBAO. 17 Mar 78; "Bao-Chan Dao-Hu"--a contract system in which the production targets (and the sections of land along with them) are consolidated by individual farms.)

In the autumn of 1979, the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee affirmed the resolution "Several Issues in Accelerating the Rate of Agricultural Development," after which the family contract obtained the right to exist. Nonetheless, they strove to limit its possibilities as much as possible, and for about a year it was employed just experimentally.

At the same time, a strong shift of focus began in the central press. In the spring of 1980, critical articles appeared against the "ultra-leftist" manifestations still existing in many rural regions, as if "the more people in the team, the better, the more revolutionary, the greater the extent of collectivization, the better, the more progressive." (Footnote 22) (RENMIN RIBAO. 25 May 80; JINGJI YANJIU. 1980, No 8, p 51.) In September of 1980, the

CCP Central Committee adopted Document No 75 ("Several Issues in Further Strengthening and Improving the System of Production Responsibility in Agriculture") (Footnote 23) (BANYOUE TAN. 1981, No 8, pp 4-10.), legalizing several forms of production responsibility--in accordance with the varying level of economic development of individual regions of the PRC. In the economically developed regions, the use of small-group or specialized contracts "with subsequent compensation for products produced jointly" was envisaged. It was indicated that the specialized contract could be employed in the breeding of fish, the cultivation of vegetables, the transport of freight, in domestic services, construction, the processing of raw materials, the cultivation of industrial crops and the breeding of livestock. The forms of the contract when conducting unified agriculture could differ: it could be granted to a group of people, individual farms or individual people. Compensation was calculated depending on the volume of production.

As we see, the sphere of application of the specialized contract was at first limited to secondary sectors and did not include grain farming. Only later, in 1981, was the specialized contract disseminated to the cultivation of the principal food crops as well.

For regions average in economic conditions, "joint production in a system of unified farm management with the delivery of tasks to each laborer" was recommended. In this form, the team divides its fields into sections and individual workers or groups receive a fixed production task. The team remains responsible for the planning and use of draft animals, machinery and fertilizer, as well as irrigation. The overall income of the team is determined as the collective income of its members and distributed among them in a procedure established earlier. In economically backward regions with difficult natural and climatic conditions, where subsistence farming predominated, it was permitted to proceed further and introduce the Bao-Chan Dao-Hu form. In this form, "the existing production team under the control of a single farm," that which was produced according to the conditions of the contract was distributed according to contract, and all that was produced beyond the stipulated amount belonged to the producer. At the same time, such a form as Bao-Gan Dao-Hu arose, that is, the full responsibility of the farm for production. (Footnote 24) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 23.) In this case it was not the teams, as before, but the individual farms that pay agricultural taxes to the state, produce the needed supplies, and deduct a certain portion of the collective funds for accumulation and welfare funds. All remaining products are their property. Thus, the peasant farms became the primary entities for calculations and accumulations. It is apparent that in the forms described, production is carried out on the basis of individual management; many (both peasants and the local leaders--ganbu) took this as a return to the individual economy that existed earlier. The words about "unified management of the production team" under these conditions became empty talk, insofar as practically all management functions were removed from the jurisdiction of the teams. It is not surprising that the Chinese press expressed many arguments against the farm procedure and emphasized that it should be employed only in poor and economically backward regions where the property of the collective economy was poorly developed and the masses were losing faith in the collective. (Footnote 25) (BANYOUE TAN. 1981, No 8, p 6.) In studying the necessity and expediency of various forms for the production-responsibility

system in the villages, it was indicated that in a country so enormous and extremely diverse in natural conditions, it was impossible to be limited to just one type of management, which for a long time was presented as the people's communes with a three-step form of property. Agriculture, the Chinese agrarians wrote, would be successfully developed only in the case where each locality finds the optimal method for managing the economy that corresponds to the natural and climatic features and meets the interests and desires of the masses. (Footnote 26) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 22.)

Soon after the appearance of Document No 75 and notwithstanding the opposition of local powers and employees, both varieties of family contract were rapidly disseminated across the whole country, passing through a series of intermediate forms. In 1981, a mass transition from consolidation of targets by groups to the consolidation of contracts by individual employees with the retention of unified management and toward the consolidation of targets by farm was noted. The latter system was rapidly transformed after the summer of 1981 into a system of full farm responsibility for production. Moreover, in the end result there occurred such a form as the consolidation of targets by individual employees with the retention of unified management. In October of 1981, 38 percent of all principal economically accountable entities in agriculture were converted to full farm responsibility for production, and this fundamentally changed the situation. The Chinese leaders were forced to acknowledge: "That which is now called a system of production responsibility has long ago gone beyond the bounds of its initial meaning and in reality relates to changes in management forms." (Footnote 27) (Ibid., p 23.)

The Chinese National Conference on Work in the Villages was held at the end of 1981 in Beijing. Its Theses emphasized that "deep and complex changes were occurring in agriculture that touch the lives of hundreds of millions of people." The existence of differing forms of the production-responsibility system was noted, and it was moreover indicated that all of these forms corresponded to the character of a collective socialist economy. The Theses also stated that 80 percent of teams had already incorporated a system of production responsibility where the income of the peasants was connected with the results of their labor. (Footnote 28) (RENMIN RIBAO. 6 Apr 82.)

The Theses, however, already reflected the past. In the spring of 1982, a system of production responsibility in the form of the family contract predominated in the Chinese villages. "The peasant family," RENMIN RIBAO wrote at the time, "in essence has become the chief production entity, and each family bears exclusive responsibility for its profits and losses." (Footnote 29) (RENMIN RIBAO. 11 Apr 82.) Thus, in the collective ownership of the land in China there arose a system of small peasant land use with its characteristic features and weaknesses.

Changes in agriculture occurred, apparently, considerably faster and not in the manner proposed in the center. In particular, the leadership recommended the distribution of the land in accordance with the amount of manpower, and not by mouths to feed. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, the land was divided precisely according to mouths to feed. The Chinese authors see as the cause of this the preservation of the view, deeply rooted in the peasantry, that the loss of land was the loss of the means of existence.

Furthermore, with a shortage of food in the country, the peasants considered solving the problem of subsistence of prime necessity. "Therefore, in carrying out the system of production responsibility in life, they turned their attention first and foremost to enjoying the use of the land, especially in those regions where the commodity economy was poorly developed." (Footnote 30) (HONGQI. 1984, No 8, p 25.)

The actual dismantling of collective production associations in agriculture required interpretation and elaboration from the Chinese leadership. The clearly expressed aspirations of the peasant masses for the conducting of an individual economy were not considered a manifestation of centrifugal tendencies and a private-property psychology, but first and foremost as a desire to be rid of the egalitarianism that had existed for many years and from administrativeness and violations of democracy. It was emphasized that the Chinese peasantry in the 1980s was not the same as it was before emancipation or soon after (Footnote 31) (An article by Zhang Tefu, "The Chinese Peasantry in the 1980s," is especially devoted to this (HONGQI. 1983, No 8, pp 19-24).), and the family contract could not be identified with the individual farms after agrarian reform. The situation and conditions in the country had changed: industry, transport, trade and the banks were in the hands of the socialist state headed by the CCP and implementing a national-democratic dictatorship. The law especially envisaged that the land remain collective property and that the peasantry enjoy the use of it, but without the right to buy, sell or rent it. Therefore the farms that received individual production tasks were, as before, a component of the socialist structure of agriculture. (Footnote 32) (HONGQI. 1981, No 19, p 24.) The incorporation of a system of production responsibility, as emphasized in the Chinese press, is an improvement of collective socialist economics and, as was affirmed, permits the successful combination of the forms of unified and separate management. (Footnote 33) (HONGQI. 1982, No 13, pp 32-35.) Firmly holding to a policy of collectivization, social property should be retained for the principal means of production--the land (including plowed fields, steppes and forest), irrigation structures (reservoirs, mechanized pumps, canals), major agricultural implements, machinery and transport equipment (powerful tractors, trailers, trucks, machinery and equipment for processing agricultural and cottage-industry products), repair equipment and accommodations used for collective production (administrative buildings, warehouses, barns and the like).

In the conversion to the forms of family contract, the collective means of production were transferred to the contractor bearing responsibility for their use and storage. The following conditions were required to be observed at the very least in this: 1) in using collective property and money, the contractor did not have the right to pass them along, rent them, pledge them, or lose or ruin them; 2) the contractor should strictly fulfill the agreement and produce that quantity and those types of products stipulated by the contract. In a violation of the stated conditions or other abuses of public property, the production team had the right to abrogate the contract and seize the social means of production, as well as to demand compensation for losses. The simultaneous employment of the forms of unified and separate management should not alter the essence of collective economics. Thus, the contractors should

not only completely fulfill the obligations before the state, but also deduct certain funds for the collective. As a result, wrote Zhang Dajian in HONGQI, "to the extent of the development of production, the amount of social means and products will increase continuously, the types of unified management will become ever greater, the opportunities for rendering assistance to the 'labor' farms will increase, among the peasant farms the division of labor will gradually develop, specialization and collaboration and the system of production responsibility will improve, and the collective economy will become stronger day by day." (Footnote 34) (Ibid., p 35.)

Over the entire course of 1982, the Chinese press emphasized the role of the planning principle in developing the national economy. In agricultural production, as in the whole economy, indicated HONGQI, it was necessary to adhere to the principle: a planned economy is the main thing, while market control is an auxiliary factor. (Footnote 35) (HONGQI. 1982, No 4, pp 9-14.)

According to the PRC Constitution, the land in the country remains collective or state property. In this document, it was indicated anew that the sale, purchase and renting of personal and contract parcels of land was not permitted. At the same time, it has a clause on the necessity of encouraging the gradual concentration of the land in the hands of "skilled farmers."

The conversion to family contract engendered small peasant land tenure in the PRC. With the availability of 100 million hectares of arable land (of which more than 5 million hectares are on state farms) and 180 million peasant farms, each farm across the country has on average a little more than 0.5 hectare. This land, however, is usually broken up into several patches, since in the distribution of land according to contracts, not only the number of mouths to feed (or manpower) was taken into account, but also the quality of the section of land granted (relief, soil, irrigation conditions, distance from the village and the like); the land was subdivided according to quality and location into 3 classes and 9 categories. (Footnote 38) (JINGJI WENTI. Taiwan, 1985, No 6, p 22.) The peasants considered it just that each family received both good and bad land. As a result, many sections of land became even smaller, especially in the southern half of the country, for which small-sized arable-land plots are typical. In the large Hongkouqiao team on the Bishi commune in Hubei Province, for example, before the conversion to the contract system there were 4,264 sections of land, and after the redistribution of land by contracts there were 4,871; for each person here there was 0.6 mu (0.04 hectares) of tillable space (usually located in various places). (Footnote 39) (HONGQI. 1984, No 8, p 25.) Obviously, this is extremely inconvenient for the arrangement of efficient farming.

How, with the existing state of affairs in the PRC, will they be able to modernize agriculture and move up onto the path of intensive and highly productive agricultural production? Chinese agrarians feel that this goal is quite achievable. The experience of other countries testifies to the fact that agriculture based on comparatively small family farms can be both highly productive and marketable. That is precisely how it should be conducted in China, they feel.

Thus, the concentration of land in the hands of "skilled farmers" is one of the principal conditions for the future modernization of agriculture. The transfer of land by contract to "skilled farmers" is an acceptable way toward this gradual concentration at the modern stage.

The incorporation of a system of production responsibility in the Chinese village has led to an appreciable increase in the output of agricultural products and the animation of economic activity in the towns. In China, however, many direct attention toward the fact that the successes have not been achieved based on the assimilation of the newest achievements of modern scientific and technical progress, but through a return to an old and in essence outmoded form of production, the resurrection of small individual cultivation. The private-property inclinations and aspirations of the Chinese peasantry have been sharply reinforced, and considerable segments of it have turned out to be stricken with bourgeois tendencies. Property stratification is also strengthening, and the level of income in peasant families, totaling an average of 375 yuan, varies from an insufficient 200 yuan to 10,000 and more (Footnote 44) (HONGQI. 1985, No 15, p 30. The author of the article (Jing Ping) notes that the share of peasant households with an annual per-capita income of 200 yuan and less still totals 1/5 and even 1/4 of all households.), as a consequence of which a new social tension has arisen in the villages. A result of the incorporation of the system of production responsibility was in the end result the fact that, beginning after the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (1978) with the "correction of shortcomings and errors" characteristic of the agricultural production associations in the past, the Chinese leadership has actually come to the elimination of the forms of collective agriculture that took shape over the course of decades. All of this is a matter of sharp discussion both in party and social-science circles. An intensive search for ways and methods for building modernized socialist agriculture developed with a regard for the specific conditions of China is continuing in the country.

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POLITICAL ACTIVISTS' ROLE IN NIGERIAN CIVIL, MILITARY REGIMES

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[Article by V. E. Khanin: "Civil and Military Policies in Nigeria: Confrontation or Partnership?"]

[Excerpts] In Soviet Eastern-studies literature, the issue of the correlation of foreign and domestic and traditional and modern forms of social development of liberated countries is actively discussed. In elaborating on the description of the current state of developing societies as transitional, a number of researchers are advancing to the fore the tendency of synthesis or symbiosis of a variety of factors and elements of transition. The relativity of the demarcation of the staged lower and higher forms as two "poles of development" is emphasized, insofar as "both the modern and the traditional develop their features with regard to each other, located within a large system and interacting within it." (Footnote 1) (The Evolution of Eastern Societies. The Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern. Moscow, 1984, p 18. See also: The Developing Countries in the Modern World. Unity and Variety. Moscow, 1983, p 279.) Attention is also directed to the fact that structurally, the progressive elements of social relations frequently arise in the modern countries of the East not from spontaneous internal development of a base, but as a consequence of the historical interaction (international conflicts in the colonial period and collaboration after the achievement of independence) of these elements with more developed societies, wherein the corresponding changes are begun not "from below" (from an economic base) but "from above"--from the political level of society built on top of it. (Footnote 2) (The Evolution of Eastern Societies..., p 265.)

Nonetheless the phenomena and processes of social synthesis in the countries of the East, apparently, are too complex to be laid out (at least, at the modern stage of research) in some single general scheme. It is essential in particular to elaborate whether there is a primary source of synthesized social forms of the features of structural development of these countries in the pre-colonial period, or whether their first cause was the forced inclusion of Afro-Asian societies in the world capitalist system. It must also be discovered whether this relationship of "traditional" and "modern" depends only on the nature of the historical era that this country is undergoing, or whether it is partly dependent on specific historical circumstances, and in

particular on the arrangement of social and political forces, the nature of the ruling regime etc.

A further development of the problem of social synthesis is very important for understanding the actual political process in Nigeria. Compared to many other countries of tropical Africa, Nigeria has been deeply involved in the interaction of the predominant local institutes with the transatlantic bourgeois-democratic forms of social organization. The administrative and political system of the country and the structure of state institutions within the framework of the constitutional set-up of independent Nigeria was almost entirely copied from Western models.

The especial role of the foreign factor in the formation of the political structure of independent Nigeria does not require especial proof. (Footnote 3) (For detail see: Ye.A. Glushchenko. "Pervaya respublika v Nigerii. Formirovaniye, krizis i padeniye neokolonialistskogo rezhima" [The First Republic in Nigeria. Formation, Crisis and Fall of the Neocolonial Regime]. Moscow, 1983, pp 8-43; "Istoriya Nigerii v novoye i noveysheye vremya" [History of Nigeria in the New and Newest Period]. Moscow, 1981, pp 229-238.] It also seems indisputable that the bearers of the Western political influence in the last two decades were the principal groups of professional politicians heading up the multi-party civilian regimes. During the existence of these regimes--1960-66 (the first republic) and 1979-83 (the second republic)--the borrowing of Western political prototypes clearly accelerated, while this process slowed during the rule of the military. The mechanism and consequences of the political modernization of Nigeria, however, were studied chiefly from the point of view of the rejection of Western constitutional models and, more precisely, of colonial power structures by local society (Footnote 4) (Ye.A. Glushchenko. Op. cit., p 111.) Therefore, the change of ruling regimes in Nigeria is sometimes considered a manifestation of the inadequacy of the "coupling" of Western forms built on top of the local and naturally grown social and political structures. This evaluation brings to the forefront the distinction in the methods and structures of power typical of the military and civilian regimes in Nigeria.

From the point of view of the concept of social synthesis, attention should be devoted to another and possibly more important trend in the political modernization of Nigeria: the utilization and transformation of the standards and institutions of the bourgeois multi-party system in the actual political process. From this point of view, it is hardly possible to consider the efforts at the repeated transfer of Western political models to Nigerian soil accidental. The experience of the first and second republics testifies to the fact that the institution of political parties (in its bourgeois-democratic and pluralistic version) is being actively adopted by the political forces and "reworked" into a mechanism (quasi-democratic in form and authoritarian in content) for the direct representation of communalistic factions of the ruling elite and the traditional interests standing behind them in the political system. As for the instability of a multi-party structure, under Nigerian conditions it is explained, apparently, not by its absolute lack of adaptability to the actual political process, but by the relative ineffectiveness of the multi-party system (at the level of ethno-social factionalism and social conflict existing in the country). The persistent

efforts of the "architects" of the second republic to find a more flexible and stable formula for political compromise also speaks in favor of this proposition.

This conclusion naturally requires further detailed study and development. It is very important, in particular, to research the mechanism of political struggle under military regimes and the role of professional politicians in it. (Footnote 5) (In the works of Soviet authors, research on the basic political subjects within the framework of the military regimes is still limited by the military bosses. See: L.N. Pribytkovskiy. *Nigeria under the Military Regimes*.--NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1980, No 6; A.S. Vlahova. *Specific Features in the Formation of the Armed Forces of Modern Nigeria*.--NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1983, No 2.) If the conclusion on the incorporation of a pluralistic political model into the "grounded" political structure in a transformed form is correct, then under military authoritarian rule elements of the direct representation of the communalistic elite groups and their direct and active influence on the military leaders should be detected, as well as the retention (although in abbreviated form) of a "pluralistic" mechanism of power.

* * *

The military came to the political helm on 31 Dec 83, replacing--for the second time over the period of independence--the professional politicians. The fall of the second republic, which existed a total of four years, once again attracted attention to the problem of the interrelationships of the military and political elites. Especially interesting on this plane is the prolonged period of power of the military (from 1966 to 1979). The role of politicians in this period remains little studied (Footnote 6) (The political role of the military bosses in this period has been analyzed in a number of works by Soviet authors. See, for example: A.S. Vlahova. *Op. cit.*; L.N. Pribytkovskiy. *Op. cit.*; "Nigeriya: sovremennyy etap razvitiya" [Nigeria: The Modern Stage of Development]. Moscow, 1978; G.I. Mirskiy. "Armiya i politika v stranakh Azii i Afriki" [The Army and Politics in the Countries of Asia and Africa]. Moscow, 1976; et al.), notwithstanding the fact that the events of those years testify to their active participation in political life. This forces a critical attitude toward the opinion current in literature on the ending of internal political struggle during the military rule. In this regard it is interesting to consider how the internal political struggle in western Nigerian during the first military regime (1966-79) dragged on. It was precisely in this region, populated by one of the most politicized peoples of the country--the Yoruba--that the role of the politicians in their interaction with the military was most clearly manifested.

The first military coup occurred in Nigeria in January of 1966. By decree of the military administration of Gen J.A. Ironsi, the activity of political parties, ethnic and professional unions and other social organizations was banned. (Footnote 7) (The effect of the decree was extended to such political parties as the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG), the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the United Congress of the Northern Zone (UCNZ), the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) and other organizations (Nigeria Year Book, 1967. Lagos, 1967, pp 47-48).) The majority of the

political parties in 1960-66 were ethnic regional groupings that basically expressed the interests of the ruling bosses of the ethnic societies of Nigeria--the Hausa and Fulbe (northern Nigeria), the Yoruba (western regions) and the Ibo (the eastern part of the country)--as well as a number of ethnic minorities. The official ban on political activity did not signify its disappearance as such. The professional politicians were able to preserve their political associations under the military regime as well. To the basic factors of interparty contradictions was added the struggle for influence with the military government, which in this period became both the principal subject and to a certain extent the object of the internal political struggle.

After a short period of confusion caused by the coming to power of the army, groups of professional politicians (and the people connected with them) began to arise once again across the country. Several of them appeared in the form of semi-legal political associations--so-called "associations" of politicians--while others arose in relatively small groups; some operated over the whole period of military rule, and others only up until the cancellation of the state of emergency. Among the largest and most active associations that operated at various stages of military rule should be singled out the "400 Club" (later the Convention for National Unity and Mutual Understanding)--the organization of Waziri Ibrahim, a major Nigerian businessman and political f

Understanding)--the organization of Waziri Ibrahim, a major Nigerian businessman and political fs. 1.), 1979, p 163), the association of Ibo politicians--the National Committee for Unity and Progress--of T. Mbu and M. Benson (Footnote 9) (The Punch. Lagos, 14 Jun 78.), the "Progressive Elements of Nigeria" of A. Ogusani, F. Okunnu and others (Footnote 10) (H. Adamu, O. Ogunsanwo. The Making of the Presidential System in Nigeria. Kano, 1981, p 4.) and the organization of minority representatives "The Club of 19" of P. Unongo and S. Lar. (Footnote 11) (The Punch. 13 Jun 78.)

An especial place among these groups was occupied by the political associations of western Nigeria, remaining an arena for sharp internal political struggle over the whole period of military rule. Two political groups operated mainly here--the leadership of the banned ethnic regional party Action Group (AG) of the prominent political figure O. Awolowo from the western part of the country, and the northern Yoruba group of allies of the former premier of the western region, S. Akintola.

Each of the indicated groupings was based on a certain ethnographic group. This explained to a certain extent the poor contacts among them. The main and, possibly, the sole unifying link for the various groups remained as before the personality of O. Awolowo (Footnote 19) (B. Dudley. Instability and Political Order. Ibadan, 1973, p 146.), with whom the leaders of the groups were in close contact. To a certain extent, such a "diversity of interests" was sanctioned by the members of the O. Awolowo group themselves, who at their meeting in 1968 acknowledged that former AG members were free of any obligations whatsoever with regard to the banned party. (Footnote 20) (The Punch. 23 Oct 78.) At the same time, the official liquidation of the party organization of the banned AG strengthened the role of personal contacts as the principal integrating factor. The situation changed after the end of the civil war (1968-70) and especially after the coming to power of the third

military government of M. Muhammad and O. Obasanjo in 1975, which declared its intention to transfer power to civilian leaders. This placed before O. Awolowo the task of uniting the various groups of western politicians for strengthening their influence on the electorate.

At the end of 1975, the first united conference of representatives of all groups allied with O. Awolowo took place, at which the association called the National Committee of Friends was officially formed (Footnote 21) (The Nigerian 1979 Elections, p 48.) (after September of 1978, that is, after the cancellation of the ban on political activity, it was the Nigerian Unity Party (NUP)). Thus, figures in the O. Awolowo group had at their disposal a well-arranged political mechanism, which gave them considerable advantages compared to their political rivals in the western regions, and first and foremost the followers of S. Akintola, killed in 1966, who were unable to unite before the end of the 1970s.

Being the principal subjects of the internal political struggle in Nigeria in 1966-79, the military and the politicians needed each other. The low level of legitimacy and institutionalization of the military regime in Nigeria continuously forced its leaders to seek the support of the politicians, who, holding in their hands the levers for manipulating public awareness, provided mass support for the military. By virtue of this, the military had to close their eyes to the activity of organizations of the type of the Committee of Friends of O. Awolowo. In the words of one of the figures of the military regime, "the so-called ban on political activity was no more than a fiction." (Footnote 50) (The Political Participation under Military Regimes, p 38.)

The struggle between the associations and the groups was thus a direct continuation of the political struggle during the first republic. Its principal goals and methods did not undergo any substantial changes compared to the period of the first civilian regime (1960-66). Symptomatic is the acknowledgment of Y. Gowon, who in one of his speeches declared that "the politicians have extracted not a single lesson from the past." (Footnote 51) (New African. 1977, No 6, p 515.) The policy of "pushing aside" the politicians from power and concentrating it in the hands of the ruling military groups, carried out by Y. Gowon in 1971-74, combined with the support of a relatively narrow stratum of the supreme civilian bureaucracy, precipitated a crisis in the military regime. The subsequent refusal to transfer power to civilian leadership in 1974 incited not only the northern politicians opposed to the regime to rise up decisively against Y. Gowon in 1976 (as had been proposed earlier), but also his former allies from the southern political groups and first and foremost the Yoruba politicians from the Committee of Friends. (Footnote 52) (Nigerian Tribune. 1 Aug 75.)

The fall of the government of Y. Gowon, however, far from met the interests of all political groups; his dismissal from power in 1975 weakened the positions of the politicians from the southern and central parts of Nigeria, and first and foremost the position of the allies of O. Awolowo. With the coming to power of the military government of M. Muhammad and O. Obasanjo, a process of advancing Hausa and Fulbe politicians began. Beginning in the middle of the 1970s, they gradually pushed the Yoruba politicians into "secondary roles."

(Footnote 53) (This was facilitated, as could be assumed, by the leaders of the third military administration (mainly northerners), with which a number of the representatives of the leaders of the "northern" Muslim politicians (including I. Vada, M. Bida, S. Shagari et al) were associated in friendly, kindred and business relations (H. Adamu, O. Ogynsanwo. Op. cit., p 2; Soldiers and Oil..., p 66). Not without interest in this regard were the declarations of O. Awolowo, who named S. Shagari (one of the leaders of the northern politicians and consequently the president of the second republic) "the favorite politician of the military" (New African. 1980, No 2, pp 26-27), and S. Inoku, who called the party of S. Shagari "the favorite child" of the third military government (New African, 1979, No 10, p 13.) In this same period, the movement of political figures of a number of ethnic minorities of southern and central Nigeria from union with the organizations of O. Awolowo to a bloc with the northern political groups took shape, which limited the sphere of influence of the Committee of Friends on a national level. In the first months of the rule of M. Muhammad and O. Obasanjo, however, the politicians from O. Awolowo's circles preserved their strong positions not only on a regional level, but on a federal one as well. This was confirmed by the composition of the Commission to Develop a Draft Constitution for Nigeria, which was created after the coming to power of the third military administration. Among the members of the commission who were professional politicians (which, according to our calculations, totaled no less than 1/3 of the total number of its members), roughly a third were members of O. Awolowo's group. (Footnote 54) (For a list of commission members see: Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975. Ed. by O. Oyediran. Ibadan, 1978, p 343-347.) The chairman of the commission in particular was a noted figure of the Committee of Friends, the well-known jurist and former commissar of the military government of the Western State, F.R.A. Williams. (Footnote 55) (The commission also included O. Awolowo himself, but he refused to participate in its work. (The Nigerian Observer. 7 Oct 75).)

Under these conditions, the O. Awolowo group had a vested interest in the most rapid exit of the military from the political stage; the immediate return of the country to civilian rule opened up opportunities for it to come to power at a federal level. The arrangement of political forces in favor of O. Awolowo was expressed in the struggle developing in the press on the issue of the timing of the transfer of power to civilian leadership. The Lagos DAILY TIMES, close to O. Awolowo, constantly demanded the transfer of power to a civilian administration, as was promised by the military leaders, in 1976 or the beginning of 1977. O. Awolowo came out with this demand himself (Footnote 56) (DAILY TIMES. 20-21 Aug 75), as did the leader of the Ibadan branch of the Committee of Friends, Bola Ige. (Footnote 57) (DAILY TIMES. 10 Aug 75). At the same time, the NEW NIGERIAN newspaper, published in Kaduna (the traditional political center of northern Nigeria) insisted on prolonging military rule for 3-5 years, which met the interests of the northern Muslim politicians. (Footnote 58) (See: Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975, p 12).

The transition to a civilian form of government was implemented in 1979. Over the 1975-79 period, the military leadership carried out a series of measures (the creation of new states, elections to local organs of power, the convening of a Constitutional Assembly etc.). They facilitated the gradual strengthening of the position of the northern politicians, who by the end of

the 1970s had become the dominant force on the nationwide level. The regrouping of political forces that occurred undoubtedly predetermined the victory of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), created by the northern political groups, in the first nationwide elections since the military coup, in August of 1979. (Footnote 59) (In the opinion of a competent observer of the journal NEW AFRICAN, "the army, in which the northerners dominated, brought S. Shagari (leader of the NPN--author) to power" (NEW AFRICAN. 1984, No 2, p 19).)

At the same time, within the framework of the former Western Region (which in 1976 was divided up into four states--Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo) and in the central West (Bendel), the adherents of the Committee of Friends of O. Awolowo and the groups allied with them remained the principal force. The results of the elections to local organs of power in these states indicate this, where the allies of O. Awolowo received the overwhelming majority of places. (Footnote 60) (DAILY SKETCH. 30 Dec 76.) The level of influence of the O. Awolowo group is also confirmed by the nature of the voting in the course of the presidential elections of 1979: 82.3, 92.8, 94.3 and 85.8 percent were cast for O. Awolowo in the four western states respectively along with 53.2 percent in the state of Bendel. (Footnote 61) (Political Digest. Vol 1, 1983, No 1, p 20.)

At practically all stages of existence in Nigeria in the first military regime, the politicians and military were objectively partners, which, by the way, did not rule out competition between them. The military coups and the subsequent transition to civilian leadership were nothing more than a shift of power in the ruling segment, called upon to hold it in the hands of the forming ruling class. It is no accident that after the return of Nigeria to a civilian regime, power turned out to be in the hands of the "old" political figures nonetheless. (Footnote 62) (An observer in the newspaper SUNDAY OBSERVER had every right to state that the "army took power from people who were known for corruption, incompetence and a tribal orientation... After almost 15 years of rule, the same army handed over power to the same people" (SUNDAY OBSERVER. 31 Dec 78.)

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INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON AFRICAN STUDIES HELD IN NIGERIA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 145-148

[Article by An.A. Gromyko and G.B. Starushenko: "Session of the International Congress on African Research (ICAR)"]

[Text] The 5th Session of the ICAR took place on December 16-21 at the University of the City of Ibadan--one of the major scientific centers of Nigeria. Among those participating in the session were more than 150 scholars and 50 people who represented foreign scientific centers of African studies in the United States, England, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, African continent were represented by 18 scientists from 9 countries (Angola, Gabon, Zaire, Zambia, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Togo). The main body of the session participants were Nigerian scientists and instructors at the universities of Nigeria. Among the Soviet delegation were An.A. Gromyko, head of the delegation, director of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a corresponding member of the Academy, and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding members G.B. Starushenko and V.P. Morozov.

The chief unifying theme of the ICAR session was "Education and Originality in Africa." The following problems were discussed in the working groups: the education process; systems of values and culture; science and technology; language and relations; socio-economic and political processes; and, ecology and society. The discussions sometimes went beyond the bounds of the established themes, however.

Nigerian President I. Babangida spoke at the opening of the session, noting that the study of African problems in various countries helps to determine ways of solving them, as well as facilitates a deepening of mutual understanding and scientific and cultural collaboration in the international arena. I. Babangida emphasized that the problems of education and originality in African culture cannot be considered apart from other acute issues, such as the observance human rights on the continent and the granting of the right to a peaceful life to the African peoples.

ICAR President A. Adjai (Nigeria) noted that the session was taking place on the 25th Anniversary of the Year of Africa. One of the chief tasks of the

forum for the African studies scholars is not only to attract the attention of international society to the most acute problems of the continent that are a legacy of the colonial past (illiteracy, hunger, poverty, apartheid), but also to make scientific recommendations for their solution and to assist in finding the way out of the vicious circle of neocolonialism and dependence. Noting a definite drop in interest in African research in the United States and England, A. Adjai spoke highly of the achievements of Soviet African studies scholars.

The first plenary session, "The State of African Research in the World," took place under the chairmanship of An.A. Gromyko. Describing the state of African studies in the USSR, he gave a speech titled "The Struggle Against the Nuclear Threat, and the Liberated Countries" in which he emphasized that the development of scientific thought in the world, including African research, and the resolution of internal problems by the countries themselves is possible only with peace and the strengthening of international collaboration.

In several of the speeches of the African scholars, the problems of political and social progress in the countries of the continent were consistently linked with issues of the preservation of peace and the reduction of the arms race. A. Aderibigwe (Lagos) noted that at the same time as enormous funds are being spent on research in the military sphere and arms production, millions of Africans are starving. It is namely neocolonialism that is responsible for the fact that up until now an atmosphere of creative activity and development has not been created on the African continent.

Ali A. Mazrui (Michigan University, United States) spoke on the fact that the South African Republic, having obtained nuclear technology from the leading Western powers and developing nuclear weapons in close collaboration with Israel, uses nuclear pressure as a destabilizing factor for the purpose of defending the system of apartheid. The organic connection of racism and weapons of mass destruction is evident. Western allies, and especially the United States, which uses African uranium resources for the production of nuclear weapons, aid in the collaboration of the racists with the Zionists.

The speeches of many scholars, and first and foremost African ones, contained criticism of the neocolonialist policies of the West. A. Kwapong (University of the United Nations, Tokyo) noted that the enormous indebtedness to Western lenders aggravates the difficult situation of millions of Africans and restrains the development of education and economics and progress in the social sphere, as well as destabilizes the situation in many regions. In his opinion, the scientists should find ways of solving the fundamental problems of Africa that hinder the achievement of full economic and political independence.

Western philosophical and sociological concepts that are directed toward separating the African peoples and hinder the correct understanding of processes taking place on the continent were subjected to criticism. The speech of K. Ogundowole (Lagos University) noted that Africa needed only that portion of the "European legacy" that assisted in the liberation of African societies from the "oppressive foreign influence" of bourgeois theories. The West is striving to disseminate the cult of individualism, which is an

obstacle on the path to domestic and foreign collective efforts in the interests of collaboration and social progress. In the opinion of this scholar, a collective approach to the solution of problems in establishing a new economic order is needed.

Many participants in the congress ascertained that the African continent is undergoing a "development crisis." Specific answers to the question of just what the African peoples and their governments need to do to overcome this crisis, however, were either not contained in the speeches, or the recommendations that were given, even from the point of view of their authors, were too general and are in need of further development of tactical measures for their realization.

In order to resolve the most acute tasks of the countries of the continent, the African scholars proposed, in particular, the following measures: to consider agriculture a priority area of development of the economy; to increase food production to the extent that imports can be completely dispensed with, as well as to supply agricultural raw materials for the developing processing industry (O.A. Adubifa, Nigerian Institute of Socio-Economic Research).

In the opinion of A. Kwapong, the only way out is based on one's own manpower and unity. "Modernization, not Westernization, of Africa" is needed. Deep social and economic transformations should be realized, and an effectively functioning state should be created--this is the general conclusion reached by many of the speakers.

On an international plane, problems of the closer association of the African oil-producing countries with the aim of coordinating their policies for combating the price declines of oil and other types of raw materials were brought forth. The developing countries should also adopt decisive measures so that the scientific and technical revolution has real results, and is not utilized by the developed capitalist states for their own selfish purposes. In particular, a demand to put an end to the enticement of skilled workers by the West (the "brain drain") was advanced.

Coming out in favor of further expanding the utilization of local industrial raw materials, Nigerian scholars feel it is essential for the state to retain a commanding position in the sphere of oil and gas production and oil refining, as well as to expand the national industrial base in the interests of refining national raw materials. Prof A. Nweke (University of Isukki, Nigeria) noted that the solution of many of the most acute problems is possible on the path of socialist development. He emphasized therein the necessity of utilizing foreign experience with a regard for the variety of specific conditions in the countries of the continent.

Appearing in the debates, G.B. Starushenko demonstrated in his report "New Paths and State Forms of Social Progress" that imperialism headed by the United States uses methods of state terrorism for foisting a single capitalist development model on the continent, ignoring thereby the deep national distinctions and traditions existing in these countries as well as the aspirations of Africa to determine independently its own path of development.

Moreover, many African peoples have already made their choice. The experience of countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, the Congo and others, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered on their way, confirms the correctness and promise of development in the direction of socialism. This choice makes it possible to combine successfully the advantages of social progress with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and thereby overcome both underdevelopment and dependence on imperialism.

In the course of discussions on the problems of education, the participants displayed much interest in the specific experience of the socialist-oriented countries. The discussion on a positive note concerned in particular the Arush Declaration and the successes of Algeria in the use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution.

The problem of improving state and political leadership of society was also considered in other reports and in the course of discussion. C. Coquerie-Vidrovich (France) gave the report "The Modern State in Africa. Heritage and Creativity" to the congress, in which it was confirmed that the "African state" is "a new type of state that has many versions." As opposed to the pre-colonial African states, it, in particular, proceeds from the principle of the unity of state territory, and the concept of "border-zones" has been replaced with the concept of "border-lines." Its second principle, supposedly borrowed from the West, is a unity of economy, and the third is the unity of the control system. The author does not take into account the class essence of states in their classification, but obliquely acknowledges the appearance of socialist-oriented states on the continent.

A roundtable discussion on the problems of southern Africa occupied an important place in the ICAR session. A. Adjala (National Institute of International Relations, Nigeria) noted that the United States not only supports the regime of apartheid economically and politically, but is also immediately entangled in racist aggressive actions against the frontline states. After the pronouncement of a policy of "constructive engagement" by President R. Reagan, South Africa strengthened its aggressive intrigues against Angola and other states. The coming to power of the new American administration led to the rise of new obstacles on the path of implementing the United Nations resolution in Namibia. A. Adjala had a high regard for the positive role of the Soviet Union, which renders international aid and support to the government of Angola, which is hindering the realization of the plans of international reaction. The permanent representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations, S. Mudenge, noted that the issue of southern Africa is not only a problem of the African majority of South Africa, but one for all of Africa and international society overall. With the liberation of South Africa, said S. Mudenge, a new balance of power will arise on the African continent, which is what the imperialist countries fear.

An.A. Gromyko elaborated the policies of the USSR and the position of Soviet scholars on the problems of southern Africa, and noted especially that the militarization of South Africa and a number of other countries by the NATO countries has become a dangerous development in events on the continent which is leading to an increased rate of arms competition in Africa. The scholars participating in the roundtable were unanimous in evaluating the situation in

the southern part of the continent and condemning the policies of the West, and first and foremost the United States, in this region.

In discussing the food problem, to which another roundtable discussion was devoted, a multitude of examples of mismanagement and incompetent leadership in the capitalist African countries were cited, which have aggravated the difficult consequences of the drought. G.B. Starushenko demonstrated on the example of Ethiopia that there exist two ways of overcoming the drought and its consequences. The first is ensuring "food security," that is rendering only food assistance, and the second is, along with food assistance, the adoption of radical measures for averting drought. Ethiopia, taking urgent steps to save the population, with the support of its friends among the socialist states, has taken the second way. Tens of thousands of people were resettled in regions not harmed by drought, work was begun on assimilating fertile virgin lands and efforts were expanded to realize the multifaceted "green revolution" program. The participants in the discussion were very interested in the experience of Ethiopia. Uku Uku (University of the City of Enugu, Nigeria) emphasized that the transformation of this country became possible thanks to the revolution and the liquidation of the feudal order.

The discussion of "Systems of Values and Culture in Africa" envisaged by the program was basically reduced to a discussion of the prospects for the development of culture in the countries of the continent. It was emphasized in the reports that it is necessary to conduct a policy of preserving original African culture along with the use of technological achievements. The report of An.A. Gromyko was devoted to questions of traditional art of Tropical Africa and a scientific approach to the study of the cultural heritage of the African peoples with a regard for the specific features of the development of society in Africa.

In the course of its work, the congress considerably expanded the treatment of its motto "Education and Originality." Education was not considered a means of affirming "originality" and "African exclusiveness," but as a tool for achieving the strategic goal--the use of the scientific and technical revolution on the continent. "It is necessary to re-examine the heritage of the past in light of the requirements of the modern day" (the report of UNESCO Director M. M'Bou). The state of the educational system in the majority of the countries of the continent was deemed unsatisfactory.

Musa Yakubu (Nigeria) formulated an original proposal directed toward the purification of the legislation of the African states of the standards and principles of foreign law still preserved in them--a legacy of colonial times.

Overall, the 5th Session of the ICAR was successful and had an anti-imperialist thrust. The anti-war theme was confidently sounded at the session. The speeches of the participants emphasized that the expansion and practical resolution in these very African countries, is possible only in an international atmosphere of mutual understanding, cooperation and detente.

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PARIS HOST TO CONFERENCE OF JAPANESE STUDIES SCHOLARS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 149-151

[Article by S. I. Verbitskiy: "Meeting of Japanese Studies Scholars in Paris"]

[Text] The Fourth International Conference of the European Association of Japanese Studies Scholars (EAJSS) was held at Paris University (Sorbonne) in September of 1985. It was founded in 1976, and its chief task is strengthening the contacts of scholars in the European countries who are occupied with research in the sphere of Japanese studies. The first three conferences took place in 1976, 1979 and 1982. About 400 scholars from various countries of Europe, as well as representatives of Japan, the United States and Israel, took part in the Fourth EAJSS.

Japanese official and academic circles demonstrated great interest in the conference. Prince Takamatsu and Japanese Ambassador to France Motono Moriyuki spoke at the opening of the conference.

Reports on problems of the middle ages and the Meiji period, read in the history section, were devoted to narrow topics, although they were of great interest in a scholarly regard. Various aspects of the aggressive policies of Japan in the Second World War, especially in China, Indochina and the Philippines were illuminated in a number of speeches.

J.I. Kim, a native of South Korea, who today works at the Political Research Center in Bern, subjected the interpretation of Japanese scholars of the text of a stele found at the end of the 19th century in Korea to a critique. The text is devoted to the events of the 5th century A.D. and has been interpreted by the Japanese since last century, and after them by European scholars, as evidence of the territorial seizures of the Japanese on the Korean peninsula in antiquity. J.I. Kim confirmed that the text of the stele was falsified by officers of the Japanese Army after its discovery.

Topical issues were touched on in the reports dedicated to the postwar period. Siratori Rey (Japan) analyzed the results of the parliamentary elections of 1983. The reports in which the participation of Japan in international organizations and the attitude of Japanese society to the problems of "security" and the "Pacific Ocean community" were considered were also of interest.

The reports of Soviet scholars I.A. Latyshev "Debatable Problems in Japanese Postwar History in the Works of Soviet Japanese Studies Scholars," S.I. Verbitskiy "The Evolution of Russian Views of Japan" and A.A. Tolstoguzov "Some Issues in the Development of Japanese Feudalism" provoked animated discussion.

The principal attention in the economic section was devoted to discussion of 16 reports, the authors of which described the interrelationships of Japan with the European countries and the state of the Japanese economy and its individual sectors. The report of S.B. Markaryan (USSR) "Basic Problems of Agriculture in Modern Japan" aroused great interest in particular.

A. Hernadi (Hungary) made a comparative analysis of the economic development of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. In a number of reports, questions of management, and in particular the hiring of qualified workers, the incorporation of Zen meditation techniques in Japanese companies, foreign trade relations, the development of the electronics industry, and problems of agriculture and small and medium enterprises were considered.

In the sociological section, along with a description of factual material, efforts were undertaken in the theoretical research of topical issues, and methodological aspects for studying Japanese society were set forth. A number of reports were devoted to the sociology of the Japanese family, the sociology of microgroups, the structure of religious consciousness and the sociology of religion, the system of communications and other problems of specific sociological research. Definite attention was devoted to an analysis of the state of the Burakumin in the system of social relations within Japanese society. A large place in the work of the section was occupied by a discussion of the nationalistic concept of "Nihonjinron" (a theory of the Japanese).

One of the principal problems under discussion was the state of women in modern Japan. Issues in the social activity of women, the extent of their productive activity, forms and methods of combining service obligations with the obligations of managing the household, raising children etc. were considered.

The report of English Japanese studies scholar N. Morsbach gave a comparative description of behavioral motivations of Europeans and Japanese in the spheres of social and productive activity. The English researcher revealed those aspects of the social psychology of the Japanese which, he affirmed, facilitate growth in labor productivity. A number of interesting pieces of data were contained in the report of American specialist Bert on the system of communications in microgroups of Japanese society. Created according to place of residence, they, in the opinion of the scholar, play an important role in the system of administrative and ideological control.

A number of reports traced the tendency to embellish social and intragroup relations in Japan, make their "exclusivity" more pronounced and accent the especial character of interpersonal relations and their distinction from Western forms. Suguta Kurumi (Japan) tried to interpret relations in small

Japanese groups (at enterprises, institutions etc.) as relations of collaboration and mutual understanding.

The themes of the reports in the philosophy and religion section were basically devoted to the religious and philosophical outlooks of ancient and middle-ages Japan. Several of them reviewed philosophical and religious trends in the postwar period, as well as the views of individual representatives of Japanese philosophical thought. The scholarly and ideological thrust of the discussion in the section developed under the noticeable influence of the world views of the representatives of philosophy from Sorbonne University, which is considered to be one of the centers of idealistic philosophy in France. The final purpose of the reports and discussions in the end result was to accent the idealistic direction in Japanese philosophy. The speech of J. Laube (FRG), who devoted his report to the influence of the views of Nietzsche on the famous Japanese 20th-century bourgeois philosopher Tanabe Hadzima, was instructive in this regard. The report of Soviet Japanese studies scholar B.V. Pospelov noted the tendency of Japanese ruling circles to use economic achievements to pressure nationalistic inclinations in the country.

In the literature section, Koyama Hiroshi (Japan) related the activity of the National Institute of Japanese Literature, founded in 1972. The archives of the institute preserve (on microfilm) 70,000 documents on the history of Japanese literature, and the library has roughly 2,600 titles of journals on Japanese philology. A computer is used to process the materials. The report of Koyama Hiroshi was for the purpose of attracting European scholars to the activity of the National Institute and to stimulate collaboration among the scholars of Japan and Europe.

The reports of Soviet scholars V.N. Goreglyad "Japanese Manuscripts and Woodcuts in the USSR. Collections and Their Study," L.L. Gromkovskaya "Problems in the Interaction of Cultures. Tokutomi Roka and Tolstoy." and G.G. Sviridov "The Study of Japanese Literature of the Middle Ages in Leningrad" were received with interest.

The work of the linguistics section reviewed various issues: the structure and semantics of the Japanese language, its history and methods of instructing foreigners. Much attention was devoted to the tasks of machine translation at the conference. The speech of Japanese computer-linguistics specialist Isivata Tosio was interesting. His report researched differences in the means of expression that exist between the Japanese and European languages, and revealed the connection of these distinctions with the specific features of the Japanese "view of the world," which complicates the formalization and automation of the process of translation from Japanese into European languages and back again. The reports of Soviet scholars S.M. Shevenko and Z.M. Shalyapina were also devoted to problems of machine translation. S.M. Shevenko set forth principles for setting up linguistic support for a system of machine translation from Japanese into Russian and noted a certain parallelism between the development of this support and the technique of teaching language to a child. The report of Z.M. Shalyapina, based on experience in work on the JRAP Japanese-Russian Machine Translation System,

was devoted to the criteria for limiting the morphological and syntactical components of the description of the Japanese language in this system.

A number of reports reviewed issues of structural organization and the sense interpretation of various Japanese units and constructions: the copulas "de aru" in combination with noun groups formed with the particle "va" (M. Villar, France), alternative means of expressing the passive and resultative (R. Simamori, France), various types of attributes (J. Hidasy, Hungary), and lexical and syntactical characteristics of Japanese scientific and technical texts that relate to the category of person in its European conception.

Two reports were also presented in the historical linguistic area. Takeuti Lown (Great Britain) conducted thorough contextual research on a number of verb suffixes of classical Japanese and based her proposed etymological interpretation of these suffixes on it; K. Refsing (Denmark) reported on the preliminary results of the comparison of two dialects of the Ainu language that existed at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries (on Sakhalin and Hokkaido respectively).

The section also considered issues of tone and intonation in Japanese, the histories and roles of foreign-language borrowings in Japanese lexicology, the relation of the written and spoken forms of the language in modern Japan etc.

The participation of Soviet Japanese studies scholars in the work of the conference allowed them to become better acquainted with the themes and scientific and political thrust of the research of Western Japanese studies scholars, to establish scientific contacts with the scholars of European countries and to express the point of view of Soviet Eastern studies scholars on the problems under discussion. At the same time, the relatively poor knowledge of the European scholars of the work of Soviet Japanese studies scholars and Japanese written sources and cultural monuments in the USSR was noted.

It was proposed to hold the fifth conference of Japanese studies scholars in the city of Durham (England) in 1988. The question of the publication of a periodic journal for the association of Japanese studies scholars was resolved in principle. The leadership of the EAJSS expressed interest in reinforcing contacts with Soviet Japanese studies scholars.

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WFTU SEMINAR ON TRADE UNION OPPOSITION TO IMF, WORLD BANK

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 158

[Unattributed article: "The Struggle of the Trade Unions Against the Policies of the IMF and the World Bank"]

[Text] In November of 1985, the World Federation of Trade Unions held a seminar in Moscow entitled "The Trade-Union Struggle Against IMF and World Bank Policies." Scholars and trade-union leaders from many countries took part in its work. WFTU Secretary I. Kushnarik and VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Secretary A.M. Subbotin greeted the participants. The chairman of the WFTU Committee on Socio-Economic Problems, M.V. Baglay, gave a report describing the activity of the IMF and the World Bank, conducted in a spirit of neocolonialism and aimed at reinforcing the economic dependence of many developing countries.

The speech of FIZEMA trade-union association Secretary Razakanaivo (Madagascar) was devoted to the difficult situation that has taken shape in Africa south of the Sahara. Touching on issues connected with the political conditions advanced by the IMF and the World Bank, he emphasized that under the pressure of the United States, the Bank and the Fund, several developing countries have been compelled to re-orient their economic strategies, which is leading to an increase in the role of private enterprise. This means that the debtor nations are not in a position to select freely an economic and political orientation.

The speech of Rene E. Ofreneo, a staff member of the Manila Institute of Industrial Relations, was devoted to negative consequences of Bank and Fund policies in the Philippines. All-India Congress of Trade Unions Secretary Raj Bahadur Gur related the struggle of Indian workers in the state sector and the All-India Congress of Trade Unions against the discriminatory policies of the Bank and the Fund.

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BOOK REVIEW/ANALYSIS OF EASTERN RELIGION-PHILOSOPHY LINKAGE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 174-181

[Review by A. S. Agadzhanyan of book "Filosofiya i religiya na zarubezhnom Vostoke. XX Vek." [Philosophy and Religion in the Eastern Countries. 20th Century]. Moscow, edited by Eastern Literature of NAUKA Publishing House, 1985, 272 pages; material in all capital letters is emphasized in original]

[Excerpts] The East is something substantially more than just a geographical aggregate of states, peoples and cultures. It is first and foremost a sphere of human existence that offers enormous variety and is at the same time a complete sphere, a special world. And furthermore, it is an inexhaustible gnosiological problem and a continuous intellectual task. The East poses eternal questions to our thought, it stubbornly resists being fitted into our conceptual constructions, it is cramped in the networks of our conceptual categories, it forces doubts, re-orientation and invention. Apparently, scholarly thought on the East is obliged to display the same inexhaustibility and multifaceted nature that are characteristic of its subject.

What is the philosophy of the East? What is Eastern religion? What is man in the Eastern cultures? When we try to answer these questions, we are forced to acknowledge that, being monists, seeking something unified, universal, general and consistent in social phenomena, we are indebted to the East for the necessity of constantly elaborating the substance of our notions on what philosophy, religion, man and much more are in general. There is one key that is perhaps able to open the way to surmounting our intellectual difficulties: in order to understand the East better, we should heed what and how it thinks of itself--of itself and of us. This is the most difficult but promising task that the collective of the book under review is trying to resolve. (Footnote) (Editor-in-Chief M.T. Stepanyants; authors' collective: V.P. Androsov, B.S. Yerasov, V.V. Zaytsev, A.A. Ignatenko, N.S. Illarionov, A.A. Kara-Murza, Yu.B. Kozlovskiy, A.D. Litman, O.V. Mezentseva, V.V. Melikov, A.V. Sagadeyev, B.S. Starostin, Yu.P. Starostina, M.T. Stepanyants, Ye.A. Frolova, G.B. Shaymukhambetova.) Think about the title. The book is put out by the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and its chief subject is philosophy. But could the word "philosophy" not stand alone in the title? While it could have, this would have unjustifiably narrowed the subject, which in this case by virtue of conventional connotations would encompass only a limited sphere of Eastern thought strictly European in form (but far from

always in content). In its current form, the title brings the reader into a most extensive region--religion--and along with that, into specific and multifaceted problems of philosophy and religion. In combining these two concepts, the task of a corrective re-thinking of each of them is sensed: it is difficult to imagine philosophy completely indifferent to religion, and religion without containing philosophy. Finally, the theme has a strict chronological framework: the 20th century. And it is becoming clear that the circle of problems outlined in the title is being taken as an independent object of study for the first time in domestic literature.

Moving on to the contents of the book, I note that expectations are realized: the book is devoted to the specific forms of interaction of the two forms of social consciousness that have taken shape in the modern East. But, before turning to the substance of the problems posed by the authors, I will make some preliminary observations about the genre of the book. Formally, we have before us an anthology of articles. But this is an anthology that "wants" to be a collective monograph. The signs of thorough planning are noticeable in the book: two introductory articles on Eastern philosophical tradition IN GENERAL and religion in the 20th century IN GENERAL; three blocks (sections) uniting three or four articles, devoted to the problems of man (ontology and ethics), faith and knowledge (science and religion) and society (in socio-economic and political aspects) respectively, wherein each of the blocks encompasses--in a repeating sequence--the principal regions and traditions: Islam, Hinduism, Japan (in the first block only), China (also in the first block only), Buddhism (except the second block) and Africa. Why then is the book not a collective monograph in the strict sense of the word? First of all because there is no single resolution of the problem in it. Moreover, it seems, the authors intended to avoid a single solution, assuming, judging overall, that Eastern studies is not yet ready for this. Nonetheless, a certain still incompletely grasped and far from incarnate nuance of a single conception runs through the book implicitly: the material itself and the high quality of its interpretation in each article in the majority of cases tends toward a theoretical unity and to the genre of a collective monograph which, we will hope, will be embodied in later works of the authors' collective.

What are the parameters of this noticeable internal unity? Several pivotal aspects of the problems can be singled out, in which the book comes into contact with the most general questions of Eastern studies.

First, this is the problem of the social development of the countries of the modern East, to which is devoted the principal body of Eastern studies research in our time. The East today is one of the centers of worldwide historical drama; Eastern societies thirst to overcome backwardness, become modern and at the same time preserve their character. Hence the urgent necessity of intensive intellectual work and searches for the "philosophical building blocks" of development. The book under review strives to show the workings of the Eastern mind in interpreting ideas of progress and the discovery of acceptable principles of social restructuring. The idealistic and world-view aspect of changes in the East in the 20th century--this is the theme of the book.

Second, the book looks on cultural and inter-cultural problems. The East is presented in it not only as a mobile social phenomenon, but as an open storehouse of cultural values. The Islamic, Buddhist and Hindu traditions of thought, their characteristic idea systems and their world views are presented in their interaction with Western culture and under conditions of Western cultural expansion. Types of thought are touched on, behind each of which is its own history and baggage of ideas, values and thoughts. The book poses the principal questions of this complex conflict and dialogue.

There is yet another problem that sometimes comes to the surface, but is always present below--the problem of the correlation of "higher" and mass consciousness. A refined, fluent and sophisticated consciousness of intellectuals inclined to pluralism is much more mobile than the strictly standardized consciousness tending toward traditional conformity of the "average resident" of the Eastern countries. The mobility at the "heights" of social consciousness, however, is inevitably determined (and this is apparent from many of the book's articles) not only by the internal laws of intellectual tradition and its contacts with other such traditions, but also by the structure of the interests, values and behavior of all social strata in the aggregate. After all, in essence, a "higher" consciousness occupied primarily with the search for solutions to the problem of development inevitably generates ideologies, that is, systems of ideas, each of which is deemed to become a model for the consciousness and behavior of the group, stratum, class or even the whole nation. Socially aloof "higher" speculation is a rare thing in the modern East; a type of wise hermit or philosophizing poet is far from typical of it, and this is a substantial change. Every theory or idea of the highly educated thinker is volens nolens advanced with a regard for mass consciousness and acquires, using the terms of one of the authors--V.V. Melikov--an instrumental load (see pp 222, 235) besides a substantive one (as the idea of sui generis).

Furthermore, the topicality of research on the forms of "higher" philosophical and religious consciousness is strengthened by the circumstance that in the East--by virtue of its historical fates--the intellectual elite to a great extent coincides with the social and political one. There exists therefore a great degree of probability that the ideas of "higher" consciousness will be incarnated in practice and dominate and determine the historical process.

The problems enumerated (the search for development formulas, cultural dialogue, the opposition of "higher" and mass consciousness) are resolved in the book on a plane with the correlation of secular philosophical and religious thought, and in the process of their development a deep specific feature typical of the East is revealed. It turns out that both types of thought are closely intertwined, permeate each other and cannot exist apart from each other. Naturally, in an attentive analysis (and the book forces us to think about this) it is possible to find religious thought patterns both in Western and, it would seem, completely secular and "free" philosophical reflections--and not only in the idealistic "theology of reason" of Hegel, but even in the atheism of Sartre and the pragmatism of James. And conversely, Western religious thought is inevitably saturated with elements of anthropocentric and secular consciousness. In the East, however, this type of diffusion is immeasurably deeper and broader in scope, they have still not

become contradictory givens. Correspondingly the Eastern thinkers resolve the task not by ascertaining or reducing them, but by surmounting the growing tension between them within a unified undivided complex, in the majority of cases striving to preserve this undividedness and save it from collapse. (Footnote 1) (Therefore the treatment of the "Soka Gakkai" ideology by Yu.B. Kozlovskiy as a two-layered formation, in which the traditional Buddhist layer is dead and plays an exclusively camouflaging role with regard to the "living" one, continuously altering its substance to the "philosophical and sociological" layer, seems incorrect (p 117)). Even in Japan, far along the path of Westernization, these layers are hardly decisively separated: it is no accident that the almost secular "philosophy of values" of "Soka Gakkai" founder Makiguti was made more Buddhist by subsequent leaders of society.)

The first article, belonging to the pen of G.B. Shaymukhambetova, is devoted to what lies at the foundation of this complex--the traditions of philosophical and religious thought. Its subject matter, it could be said, is unbounded: the discussion actually concerns the traditions and specific features of the spiritual culture of the East. Unfortunately, the author did not have the opportunity of expanding the scope of her article in a proper manner. Unfortunately--for the text is interesting--the article is conceived and executed problematically and competently. G.B. Shaymukhambetova's interpretation of the traditions of Eastern thought on the plane of its correlation with Western spiritual culture does not proceed along the path of vulgar comparisons defining the East as the negative of the West. The author does not permit the illusion of a single East to distract her, dividing it into regions and traditions and juxtaposing them. Thus, by way of example, the thesis of the accord of Islamic and Western Christian thought brings the mechanical opposition of "East--West" to a new and higher level of complexity.

Some cultural traditions have fundamental significance for understanding the modern spiritual situation in the East. As it seems, the very indivisibility of spiritual culture is a tradition. In the West, the classical philosopher feels himself to a certain extent to be beyond myth and religion, and philosophy has become the "religion" of the free-thinking man, who proposes his own conception of the world, contending with others and affirming his own personal reflective consciousness. There was nothing similar in any Eastern tradition. The Eastern style of philosophizing is commentative: exegesis is the principal form, and a return to truth found earlier, but later lost (p 25) is its principal task. This tradition is preserved today: China's Feng Youlan seeks a canon in the neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, Buddhist reformers are not free of the cult of holy texts (p 134; some "textology" has become typical for Buddhist studies!); elements of commentationism are discernible even in the exposition of the views of Nisitani Keidzi (pp 99-100).

Finally, society thinks in different ways. In Western culture, "sociality" is the only salvation for sinful man torn away from God, and society is of value in and of itself; for the traditional Eastern consciousness, "sociality" is either indifferent to a God world order and the sense of human life (some Hindi systems of thought and Buddhism) or is completely united with it and is not conceived of as something in particular (Islam, Confucianism).

I have devoted so much attention to a review of the problems of traditional heritage, to which the article of G.B. Shaymukhambetova is devoted, because the 20th century was a time of dramatic re-thinking of precisely this heritage for Eastern thought. It is true that information and judgments on the results achieved and the tendencies of this intensive spiritual work are scattered throughout the book, without being brought together into a system. But some of these results are so obvious, as is often confirmed in various material, that they can easily be formed into a certain order in the mind of the reader, and the reviewer as one of the readers can take it upon himself to boldly offer his own version for ordering them. A well-defined typology based on the criterion of the relation to the legacy proposed by M.T. Stepanyants could also serve as a key for ordering the conclusions. And nonetheless, in my opinion, it would be preferable to accent several substantive instances, which I will try to do below.

THE REASONING SUBJECT BECOMES A SOCIAL FIGURE. The turn to social problems, as can be concluded from an analysis of specific material, was caused by all that was discussed above: after the complex and painstaking work of Eastern "higher" consciousness, an empirical, "lay" and worldly one was constituted as an independent sphere, either completely secular or at least completely "pleasing to God"; the new man was forced to look around, and he saw others, and only then the radical requirement characteristic of the 20th century of development and social modernization acquired real outlines. The social mind began to comprehend reality in and of itself. In Indian philosophy, the traditional problem of moksha acquires a social nuance: Bhava preaches "collective moksha," and, as the means of achieving it--social transformations (p 89); the same idea is incorporated in the utopia of "Jivanmukts" of Vivekananda, the "Sarvodaya" of Gandhi and the "total revolution" of J. Narayan; the "enlightened" is burdened with the duty of service, pulling up the rest behind (p 89). In the Muslim world, more than anywhere else (by virtue of the total pretensions in the social sphere traditional in Islam), the 20th century produced a whole bouquet of Islamic social theories--from orthodox conservative to orthodox nihilistic, such as, for example, the "Muslim brothers" theory of ideologist S. Kutba (pp 215-216). Social problems in a more or less rational and more or less clear form are also contained in Buddhist and African concepts (see the chapter articles by Yu.P. and B.S. Starostin and A.A. Kara-Murza). The authors of these concepts are conducting a search for solutions to the problems of ownership, equality and inequality, and the political legitimacy of violence as a social action. The authors of these concepts are trying to discover a basis for their views in religious traditions, and the very fact that such a basis is found for differing and even opposing views (recall, for example, the disparity of the attitudes of the Koran to the idea of equality revealed in the 20th century), speaks of a certain emancipation of sociological thought from tradition. But as a rule, the basis is essential nonetheless: in turning toward social problems, any "higher" concept presupposes a reference group, that is, appeals to the mass consciousness and, therefore, is ideologized.

RELIGION BECOMES AN IDEOLOGICAL TOOL. Ideologist Ali Shariati of the Muslim left, under the conditions of a sharp "politicization of Islam" and the "Islamization of politics" noted by A.A. Ignatenko, contrasts the model of the historian and the philosopher with the model of the intellectual obligated to

take mass religiosity into account (p 76). Buddhist modernists and reformers, with the aid of traditional doctrines, are bringing to the masses their own greatly non-traditional views (see the chapter articles of V.P. Androsov and Yu.P. and B.S. Starostin). V.V. Melikov interprets the "exoticity postulate" advanced by Vivekananda not only as a call to "descend to Earth," turning to face THIS world, but as an appeal "to all strata of society" (p 230), a striving of the intellectual to move from "contemplation" to "participation" (p 237). A.A. Kara-Murza confirms that notwithstanding the presence of rational political concepts, the politicization of the masses in Africa in the majority of cases occurs in irrational forms (p 268).

We see that the traditionality of mass consciousness corrects the achievements of "higher" consciousness. The intellectual elite translates its discoveries into language accessible to the masses, and this language most often turns out to be the religious language of traditional culture. But none of this signifies in any way that the "higher" thought itself has become completely rational and is occupied only with "translation." Tradition also has an effect on "higher" consciousness, and this in particular is revealed in searches for originality.

THE SEARCH FOR ORIGINALITY--AN ANSWER TO WESTERN INFLUENCE. This influence, as shown in the book, is quite great. The consciousness of the Eastern intellectual educated at Oxford or the Sorbonne is saturated with the categories of Western thought. On the pages of the book, we encounter both the subjective idealism of the Western type (for example, in the person of Imam Abd al-Fatah Imam--pp 78-79) and the noticeable effect of neo-Kantianism (the "philosophy of values" of Makiguti, pp 111-112), as well as positivism (as, for example, Z.N. Mahmud, p 174). The influence of Western philosophy is so great that beyond a certain point the EASTERN philosopher in essence ceases to be one: the clearest example here is the affirmation of N.S. Illarionov (with references to the works of B.S. Yerasov and M.Ya. Korneyev) that the sources of the ideology of Negritude lie in the works of Western ethnologists (p 199).

But it would be a simplification to consider Eastern thought to be for the most part a passive subject of influence. The best refutation of that is the irregularity of the influence of the Western schools of philosophy. Apparent from the book under review is the priority of existentialism and the line of a "philosophy of life," while in a historical philosophical retrospective--interest in Augustine, mystics, Schilling and the romantics of the 19th century. The gnosiological explanation of this priority is undoubted: Eastern thought tends toward that which is closest to itself and which stands in opposition to the basic paradigm of Western thought. Only on this path can such a jealously guarded originality be preserved.

Moreover, a clearly negative reaction to the "West" is possible associated with unrestrained apologetics of intrinsic tradition. Such are the "Islamic revival," the "Buddhist renaissance" and the intoxication with the "African personality." Many ideologists, however, comprehend the doomed nature of this type of radical purism. (Footnote 4) (Furthermore, the purists themselves are, in essence, not free of Western influence. Is not the concept of a vital force introduced into African thought by Belgian missionary P. Tempels and

seized by the ideologists of Negritude the force vitale of Bergson?) The majority of them are striving for a SYNTHESIS. The search for a synthesis from among all possible forms is the chief subject of the book under review. This is both the combination of Western ideas and Buddhism in the "Soka Gakkai" ideology (p 109), the combination of science and religion in India (p 186), faith and rational scientific knowledge among the Arabs (p 83) and the popularity of the "middle philosophy" of E. Schumacher (his concept of "Buddhist economics" based on "intermediate technology"--p 244). But the most typical aim of all of these searches, as is correctly noted by several authors, is the desire to fuse Western material civilization with Eastern (Islamic, Buddhist, Hindi etc.) spirituality, which, of course, is no more than an illusion. In practice, the work of synthesis turns out to be much more complex: the ideas being combined have an effect on each other, thereby undergoing changes, their fusion is unsteady, the accents are constantly shifting etc. But, one way or another, the tradition is deformed, while originality is preserved. As for the multitude of forms, approaches of thought and intellectual solutions, not only a clash of intrinsically different religious and philosophical traditions, but also a battle of social interests, lies at the foundation of it.

"HIGHER" THOUGHT AND THE MODERN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT. The problems connected with overcoming backwardness and the tasks of modernization required the decisive shifts in the spiritual sphere that we have discussed above. Furthermore, they required the advancement of specific recommendations, strategies and programs. This or that structure of ideas, this or that accent in integrating philosophical and religious tradition, and this or that form of synthesis was facilitated not only by gnosiological objectives and the cultural and genetic code, but to a great extent by the social and political positions of the ideologists themselves. Only some of the authors of the work under review, in analyzing the shifts that occurred in "higher" thought, touched on issues of their social determination. It is true that the inadequate development of problems of social culture of Eastern societies and the varying nature of conclusions in this sphere make the social attribution of ideas an extremely complex and unreliable affair. The most widespread opinion in domestic literature, it can be stated in digressing, according to which the reformers of tradition represent the interests of the national bourgeoisie, while the "revivalists" are the petty-bourgeois segments, is, in my opinion, in need of extremely substantial elaboration. A direct analogy of the transformations of Eastern consciousness with the phenomena of European humanism and reformation with the formation of a bourgeois ideological complex in Europe in modern times seems too simplified and does not fully reflect the essence of the processes that have occurred in the East. Thus, it can hardly be said that the reformers of the whole pre-capitalist tradition can be considered a social evil. "Bourgeois" nationalism in the East in the 20th century signified first and foremost anticolonialism and in a certain sense was a contrast with Western capitalism; therefore, "bourgeois" consciousness in the East did not deny tradition, but sought a synthesis with it. Furthermore, the East in the 20th century with its mobility of social structure engendered a phenomenon such as "national ideologies" that aspired to "a class-transcending state" and very uniquely, each in its own way, answering the main questions of "higher" Eastern consciousness. Unfortunately, these ideologists escaped the attention of the authors. It

seems that a simple tie-in reflecting the complex reality of Modern Eastern thought with the social and historical context is still a matter for the future.

Overall, the book under review is inquiring and trailblazing in its nature. This concerns both its specific genre and structural composition features, to which the attention of the reviewers was directed, and several features of its research stylistics, and for example, in the majority of cases, its sensible caution and suspension of judgment along with a striving to avoid broad generalizations unprepared by the development of science and a desire not to draw final conclusions where a problem can still be discerned. At the same time, the book poses questions that are so topical, and presents the reader with such a multitude of ideas and observations, that it makes interest in the material and problems inevitable. A Hegelian disdainful and condescending approach to Eastern thought, of the predominance of which one of the authors discusses (pp 10-12), should be overcome (the categorical announcement on p 94 that Hindi thought patterns are "theoretically groundless" is an annoying dissonance in the book). Eastern thought is an integral part of the spiritual tradition of all of mankind. And the book under review is one of the first books in domestic humanitarian studies that tries to return the East to its worthy place in modern spiritual culture.

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BOOK ON PHILIPPINE NATIONALISM REVIEWED

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[Review by V.V. Sumskiy of book "Ideologi filippinskogo natsionalizma" [Ideologists of Philippine Nationalism] by G.I. Levinson. Moscow, edited by Eastern Literature of the NAUKA Publishing House, 1983, 192 pages]

[Text] Among the states of the modern East, the Philippines, in view of its unique combination of historical, social, cultural, political and other factors, has long stood somewhat apart. This sole Catholic country in Asia was subjected first to Spanish, and then American, colonial rule and Japanese occupation. The Filipinos found independence after passing through a period of relatively broad autonomy (the second half of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s) that other colonial peoples did not know. In the postwar years, the republic experienced--greatly due to its own multifaceted and far from equal relations with the United States--estrangement from the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Up to the beginning of the 1970s, the Philippines retained several attributes of bourgeois democracy, at the same time as a "dismantling" of Western-style parliamentary structures occurred in many former colonies. The fate of Philippine nationalism was also unique. Its ascent was observed during the movement for political reforms (the second half of the 19th century), in the course of the wars of liberation in 1896-1901 against the Spanish and American colonizers, and then in the 1920s and 1930s on the very eve of autonomy. It would seem that the elimination of colonial orders should have stimulated a quite powerful nationalistic splash. It turned out otherwise in practice. Independence under conditions of strict military, political and economic attachment to the former mother country aroused more disenchantment than enthusiasm among Filipinos. Lorenzo Tanada--a veteran of Philippine politics and one of the main personalities in the book of G.I. Levinson being reviewed--was not without foundation in feeling that "however ironic it sounds, 1946, the year of the birth of our republic and the subsequent decade" was the time of greatest decline in nationalism in the Philippines (p 141). In the middle of the 1950s, however, Philippine nationalism proclaimed itself further and louder. In the 1960s and 1970s it became even more apparent: political and ideological processes in this country, with all of their specific features, was subject to the same general laws as the rest of the "Third World." The turn to authoritarianism in 1972 took shape, as almost everywhere in the modern East, through nationalistic slogans. For more than ten years, the "New Society" regime of President F.

Marcos, actively developing and propagandizing nationalistic concepts, had strove to transform nationalism into an effective tool for internal political stabilization and supreme control over the spiritual life of society. In light of all of this, as well as the tempestuous political events of 1986, the book of G.I. Levinson arouses heightened interest, the more so as a careful account of specific Philippine features is combined with the discovery of those instances of political and ideological development that link the Philippines with other liberated countries.

The monograph opens with a substantive and problem-filled introduction. The author here formulates the principles of an approach to nationalism as a world view that orients people toward the isolation of "their" social and ethnic society, the absolutization of its virtues and hostility toward "foreign" ones. Deserving moral condemnation, such an inclination under certain historical circumstances "consistently arises and is widely disseminated, relating in this sense to inevitable expenses in social and political progress. These conditions arise in an atmosphere immediately preceding and accompanying the process of the formation of a nation, wherein the nationalism engendered by these conditions is especially animated where the national development occurs under foreign oppression (overt or covert)" (p 5). In this case nationalism, as G.I. Levinson emphasizes, should be understood "as an instinctive psychological self-compensation for the many centuries of humiliation of a people by arrogant foreign rulers..." (Ibid.). In acknowledging a certain historical rightness behind Afro-Asian nationalism and establishing the presence of relatively progressive tendencies in it, the author makes an important proviso: this nationalism, like any other, carries ideas of national narrowness that completely contradict the spirit of the modern era--an era of intensive international exchange of ideas and technologies and the internationalization of cultural intercourse. Also substantial is the fact that the stage of sovereign development, "a nationalistic ideology plays more and more into the hands of local exploitative segments, who try, under the banner of preserving class-free national unity, to paralyze the aspirations of the lower classes for radical social transformations..." (p 6). These judgments can be briefly summarized as follows: Afro-Asian nationalism is objectively inevitable, but the interests of social progress also require the objective surmounting of nationalistic illusions.

The introduction illuminates specific features of the ethnic, confessional, social and economic situation in the modern Philippines as well, considering factors that complicate the establishment of a unified Philippine nation and national consciousness (ethno-linguistic diversity, the enclave nature of bourgeois modernization, the lack of spiritual support in the developed cultural and religious traditions of local origin etc.). A historical digression is further undertaken which aids in the better understanding of what the revolutionary events that occurred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries and the images of prominent educator Jose Rizal and other heroes of the liberation movement mean for the Filipino of our time; what political and religious organizations have taken upon themselves the task of propagandizing nationalistic ideas in the postwar period; and, what were the principal tendencies of nationalism in the period of autonomy, noted for the ideological and propagandistic activity of M. Keson, M. Rohas

and B. Ramos. These pages give a good representation of the historical roots of modern Philippine nationalism and the social environment feeding it.

In noting that the ideological situation can be presented in different ways--historical dynamics, the classification of ideological trends and their representatives according to typological traits etc.--the author emphasizes that he has chosen for period roughly after 1946 a "personalized method of description wherein an attempt is made to uncover two aspects--typological and dynamic--through an analysis of the views of several specific ideologists of nationalism" (p 45). We thus have before us a series of clear portraits of world views. In Chapter One, the leading participants in the political struggle of the 1940s and 1950s--Jose Laurel and Claro Recto--are presented to the reader (described as liberal-bourgeois nationalists). The now deceased provincial (leader of the "Philippine Province") of the Jesuit order and major historian Orasio De la Costa and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus (who in later years tried to coordinate the activities of anti-Marxist emigre groups in the United States) are singled out by the author as spokesmen for Philippine Catholic nationalism (Ch. 2). Next at the center of attention is the authoritative and prolific publicist Renato Constantino and the already mentioned Lorenzo Tanada, relating to the leftist-radical direction in the nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s (Ch. 3; here the theoretical tenets of Jose-Maria Sison, who is defined as an ideologist of leftist-radical popular nationalism, are subjected to a critique). Finally, in the fourth and concluding chapter which is devoted to an analysis of the concepts of former President of the Republic Ferdinand Marcos, specific features of nationalism elevated to the level of official doctrine and serving as the ideological justification of an authoritarian regime are considered. As we see, the problem of typology has in fact not been averted. Nonetheless, in the opinion of the reviewer, the effective achievement of G.I. Levinson is not so much this as a graphic (that is to say, human) demonstration of the evolution of Philippine nationalism and the internal affinity of its various trends and the relationships of continuity among them.

Comparing the systems of views described in the book, it is not difficult to be convinced that the most visible nationalistic ideologists of the Philippines, notwithstanding differences in their social-class and political positions, consider roughly the same questions and frequently give similar answers to them. Many of them are searching for solutions to the most acute modern problems in a pre-colonial antiquity "unspoiled" by Western influences and in a resurrection of traditional standards, institutions and values. Almost all of them express the sense that for the Filipinos the postwar period is lacking in national consolidation and a harmonious national consciousness, and that in this regard it is essential to concentrate efforts on supporting national unity, completely subordinating the interests of individual social groups and, the more so, personalities to this aim. They agree, as a rule, on the fact that it is genuinely possible to ensure national interests only by advancing along a "third" intermediate path between capitalism and socialism. Behind the search for this path for the majority of them is visible the desire not to permit the shift of political initiative to the communists and other leftists. Finally, practically all of them want to see their motherland free of neocolonialist fetters and in the role of a fully-empowered member (and even better--as one of the leaders) of the Afro-Asian community of nations.

Even extreme leftist J.-M. Sison is not all that far from the other people in the book (from C. Recto, for example) in his views on the village as the repository of all that is genuinely national and revolutionary, in his calls for achieving Philippine hegemony in Southeast Asia and to follow a course of Pan-Asianism in the international arena. Naturally, there are even more points of contact in the views of those thinkers who were joined in life in the relationship of teacher and pupil (as, say, C. Recto and R. Constantino).

Moreover, in becoming acquainted with the views of C. Recto, O. De la Costa and R. Constantino through the book of G.I. Levinson, something else is clearly sensed: how difficult the internal world of the modern Afro-Asian intellectual is to categorize, how changing and contradictory it is. By way of example, O. De la Costa was able to "sense the contradictions inherent in nationalism, to take note of the insurmountable difficulties standing before those who try to place nationalism at the service of creation: 'How to extract the poison of hatred from this movement--hatred of the foreigner, of the former colonial ruler, of the neighbor who prospered too much--without depriving the movement of its demonic power? How to rid it of arrogance, from negative self-admiration, without, however, depriving it of the ability to instill the highest confidence in oneself, which is essential for courageous innovations? How, finally, to make it compatible with rational internationalism, but without thereby emasculating it completely?'" (pp 85-86). Nonetheless, the striving to preserve faithfulness to nationalism, to be its consistent defender or propagandist, as a rule, turned out to be stronger than the attempts to go beyond the bounds of nationalistic dogma. The specific logic of nationalism was and is leading even gifted and highly educated thinkers to knowingly absurd and socially dangerous conclusions. Thus R. Constantino, wishing for the resurrection of a national consciousness untroubled by outside influences, came out with the demand to establish a "language barrier," that is, to refrain from using English as a means of communication. "It need not be said," writes G.I. Levinson, "what damage such linguistic isolation would have inflicted on the development of Philippine economics, technology and science. But he (R. Constantino--author) did not consider another more serious question as well: wouldn't the refusal to learn English create a situation in which a very narrow segment, the upper reaches of educated Filipinos, would turn out to have a monopoly in the selection of foreign scientific, political and other literature for translation into the local language and in this manner obtain in their grasp a powerful tool for the ideological indoctrination of the Philippine population in their own social and political interests, partitioning them off with an impenetrable language barrier from the 'undesired' achievements of world culture and political thought?" (p 130). The monograph contains other examples of the fact that the aims of nationalism hinder its adherents from thinking sensibly and begins to "dizzy" them somewhat (see pp 128, 134-139 and others).

Overall, the book of G.I. Levinson contains several finds connected with a professionally cautious attitude to specific material and an attentive grasp of sources. For example, several aspects of the ideological orientation of R. Constantino are uncovered by an analysis of how he uses pronouns. Levinson directs attention to the fact that R. Constantino, systematically criticizing ordinary fellow citizens for indifference to the fate of the nation (and, in essence, an unsatisfactory response to his own ideas), prefers to use "we"

instead of "they": "We are demonstrating the venality of the national spirit... We live according to the model of a foreign society... We fear an isolated national existence, are unable to think originally" and the like (see p 118). Outwardly this recalls an attempt to identify himself with the popular masses, whatever their shortcomings. Perhaps the Philippine publicist subjectively even had something of the sort in mind. When the matter comes to a confirmed type, however: "We adopted the consumer standards of the United States," "We grew fat from a passion for luxurious living, which we can hardly permit ourselves" etc., the author has every reason to reproach R. Constantino for the fact that with the aid of the word "we" he actually "did not join himself with the people, but cut himself off from them, cut himself off from all of those who not only had not 'grown fat' in the pursuit of foreign 'consumer standards,' but drag out a poverty-stricken and half-starved existence" (p 119). And further along, G.I. Levinson justly points out that R. Constantino was guilty not so much of hypercriticism as "of neglecting the actual thoughts and aspirations of the working majority, that is, of a flaw characteristic of socially limited nationalism" (p 119). In quoting these remarks, I note that however harsh the author with regard to this or that nationalistic delusion, a note of sympathy is perceived whenever the discussion concerns a genuine search for truth, even an unsuccessful one.

One of the most interesting instances of research is the analysis of the atmosphere in the Philippines during the experiment with the "New Society," the description of the political and ideological initiatives of F. Marcos and their real social cause, and the administrative efforts to transform official nationalism into the likeness of a "political religion" (see pp 161-184). In considering these issues, Levinson comes to the conclusion that in undermining the political and economic positions of the so-called old oligarchy and reinforcing the unitary nature of Philippine statehood, the authoritarian regime turned out to be organically unable to resolve many of the most pressing problems of Philippine society, and first and foremost the problem of social justice. It is not surprising that the "bureaucratic nationalism" (an expression of R. Constantino) propagated by F. Marcos did not arouse much enthusiasm among the people and, accordingly, did not fulfill the functions entrusted to it for the stabilization of the regime.

It is noteworthy that the concepts of Marcos are full of echoes, and at times almost word-for-word repetitions, of positions advanced both by those who did not live to 1972 (J. Laurel, C. Recto) and currently healthy critics of his governments (R. Manglapus, L. Tanada, R. Constantino). It seems that this induced the conclusion that in their activity all of the ideologists cited objectively furthered (naturally, each to a varying extent) the spiritual preparation of Philippine society for the authoritarian turn. In my opinion, this conclusion is not forced. The specific material cited by Levinson testifies convincingly that in all the variety of nationalistic trends there are invariably present more or less expressed anti-individualistic and anti-universalist themes. Simple logic alone suggests that the absolutization of nationalism is impossible without detriment to the personality (it is turned into a particle of the nations deprived of any autonomy) and general human values (which wilt in the radiance of the "nationalistic sun"). Hence it follows that the social environment undergoing the development of nationalistic ideas is predisposed to authoritarianism one way or another,

since the low social prestige of the personality and universal ideals favors, possibly as nothing else, the inculcation of authoritarian political methods.

I will allow myself some critical observations. In my opinion, the type definitions given by Levinson are sometimes imprecise. Is the description "liberal-bourgeois nationalist" completely applicable to J. Laurel, for example? After all, as early as before the war, he propagated the idea of a "constitutional," "benevolent dictatorship" (a prototype of which for him was militarist Japan). Becoming president of the puppet Philippine republic created by the Japanese occupiers, he proclaimed an openly authoritarian program that decisively renounced ideological pluralism and the multiparty system, declared the complete subordination of the citizens to the interests of a "strong" state and the like. Undoubtedly, all of this is well known to the author (although there is no evidence of it in the book). If he feels that Laurel has overcome views of this type, it should be specially noted.

The monograph has a brief and overall extremely qualified survey of the changes that are occurring in world Catholicism since the reign of Pope John XXIII (this survey is an essential foreword to the analysis of the views of O. De la Costa and R. Manglapus). The definitive conclusion that "over the last two decades of Vatican social doctrine aimed at the developing countries, it turns out to be consonant with almost all of the principal postulates of Afro-Asian nationalism" (p 83) is, however, possibly excessively categorical. By the way, a little earlier G.I. Levinson himself had noted that the support of personalistic and universalist aspirations is as before, notwithstanding a multitude of innovations, the core of official Catholic doctrine (see p 80). Consequently, extremely substantive differences are preserved between the latter and Afro-Asian Nationalistic constructions (if the anti-individualistic and anti-universalist potentialities are recalled).

Naturally, these partial observations cannot alter the overall most positive impression of the monograph. In conclusion I would like to note that scholarly competence is combined in the book with clarity and animation of exposition. This should expand the circle of its readers.

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BOOK ON ROLE OF ISLAMIC CLERGY IN IRAN'S REVOLUTION REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 86 pp 185-189

[Review by V.N. Plastun of book "Shiitskoye dukhovenstvo v sovremennom Irane" [The Shiite Clergy in Modern Iran] by Ye.A. Doroshenko. Second edition, corrected and enlarged. Moscow, edited by Eastern Literature of the NAUKA Publishing House, 1985, 229 pages]

[Text] The decade that has passed since the first edition of the book under review (Footnote 1) (for a review of the first edition see: NAUKA I RELIGIYA. 1975, No 6, pp 94-95) has been full of rapid and sometimes unforeseen events both in Iran itself, where as a result of the anti-monarchical revolution of 1978-79 a new social and political force--the Shiite clergy--came to power, and in other Muslim countries, in which a clear tendency toward strengthening the religious factor in various spheres of social life has been observed.

The Iranian events provoked a whole stream of publications in the West, among which serious research has begun to appear in recent years. Ye.A. Doroshenko has attentively studied foreign and Soviet literature on this theme that came out in the 1970s and 1980s, which has allowed her to rework and supplement substantially the text of the first edition of the book.

Among the chief problems receiving treatment in Ye.A. Doroshenko's monograph, among the first should be cited the role of Islam, "especially in its Shiite direction, in the social and political life of Iran (up to the end of the 1970s)" (p 5); the situation of the Shiite clergy and the nature of its interrelationships with the other social segments of society and the state during the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79); and the religious, philosophical and political views of the leading Shiite ideologists. Most important for an understanding of historical progress of Iran in recent decades, in my opinion, are the sections of the book that research the positions and ideological and theoretical conceptions of the clergy in the pre-revolutionary period, its conduct in the course of the revolution of 1978-79, the tactics that brought it to power and the methods that were employed in the struggle against the shah's regime and, after the overthrow of the latter, against the progressive forces, and the modern structure of the ruling theocratic hierarchy.

In the postwar period, with regard to the struggle of various political forces in Iran around the nationalization of oil, two quite clearly defined camps appeared among the Shiite clergy. One of these was headed by the popular Shiite ideologist Abolhassan Kashani and supported by the middle and lower segments of the clergy. He showed himself to be an active advocate of the intervention of representatives of religious circles into politics. As early as the beginning of the 1940s, Kashani won a reputation with sharp anti-British speeches. As for the internal life of the country, he preached religious intolerance, the idea of a higher destiny for Iranian Shiites, pan-Islamism etc., in which were supported the Muslim terrorist organizations Fadayin-e Eslam and Mujahedin-e Eslam. The rival of Kashani and his group was the faction of clergy headed by Ayatollah Borujerdi, who occupied an at least demonstrative neutral position with regard to the monarchy and preferred "discussion in the sphere of the shari'a" rather than the sphere of politics (pp 94-95).

In the heat of battle for the nationalization of oil, A. Kashani actively supported the government of M. Mossadeq, but after the ratification of the law on nationalization, he came out with a list of demands for the government which actually signified the pretensions of the clergy to create a state in Iran "on the model of the caliphate" and its participation in government (pp 110-111). The author analyzes in detail the maneuverings of the clergy, which conducted in those years a policy of avoiding taking sides between the shah and the government of M. Mossadeq and the interests of Great Britain and the United States in attempts to reinforce their influence and gradually obtain access to the controls of power. Documents produced in the monograph show that "while Kashani was not reconciled to relations with Great Britain, he displayed tolerance with regard to relations with the United States and did not object to the presence of American advisors in Iran" (p 113).

Ye.A. Doroshenko researches in no less detail the problem of the relationships of the ruling circles and the clergy during the "White Revolution"--the reforms announced by Shah M.R. Pahlavi and including a limitation on land property, the nationalization of forests, the granting of the right to vote to women, the participation of the workers in enterprise profits and the like. As is well known, the clergy presented a practically unified front against the measures of the rulers. In this case, the author writes, the opposition to the reforms is explained not so much by the obscurantism of the clergy so much as its apprehension at "losing influence in many spheres of social life and the fear of the undermining of its economic base" (p 121).

The Shiite leaders brought along some of the middle classes, petty bourgeois and semi-proletarian masses. In protest demonstrations which culminated in June of 1963, secular opposition also took part in the form of representatives of the radical intelligentsia and students. Whereas the masses, however, under the powerful influence of the clergy, came out under the slogans of the unconditional repeal of the reforms, the opposition demanded the establishment of "legal power through the holding of free elections to the Majlis," which, they felt, would weaken the despotic rule of the shah (p 122).

Summing up the results of the struggle "for" and "against" the reforms of 1960-63, the author makes a theoretical division of the forces within the

clergy into four groups: the pro-monarchy group, the neutral group, the radical group (headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini) and the "reformist" group, which was close to the radicals, but devoted its principal attention to plans to "reshape and transform the Shiite religious institutions and the medreses." The "reformists" were headed by the ayatollahs Motahhari, Beheshti, Talegani and others (p 127).

The rout of the anti-shah movement in 1963 can be considered a turning point in the regrouping of forces and the origin of new methods and forms of struggle against the dictatorship of the shah and imperialist domination of the economics and politics of Iran. In the middle of the 1960s, revolutionary organizations formed by youth began to arise that chose the path of armed struggle, among which the most well known are the The Organization of Fadayin Partisans of the Iranian People (Fadayin-e Khalq) and the Organization of Mujahedin of the Iranian People (Mujahedin-e Khalq). The former, according to its program directives and practical activities, strove, notwithstanding several failures, to employ Marxist-Leninist theory creatively under the specific conditions of their own country. The latter group was a revolutionary democratic organization that was an eclectic combination of Marxism and Islam in an ideological platform: the Mujahedin tried and are trying to combine the principles of class struggle and Marxist analysis of social structure with egalitarian principles of Islam.

The strengthening of influence of the opposition clergy simultaneously with the armed uprisings of the Fadayin and Mujahedin provoked alarm in the ruling circles. Clear signs of stress in relations between the rulers and the clergy were manifested in 1971, during the magnificent celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. Eminent mujtahids, ayatollahs and mullahs of the religious centers of the country sent a multitude of telegrams of protest to the shah against the campaign of glorification of pre-Islamic civilization, the religion of Zoroastrianism and the "grandeur of the Aryan soul." It is apparent (unfortunately, this is not clearly established by the author) that the hostility of the representatives of religious circles with regard to the monarchy was far from provoked by this alone: it is no accident that in leaflets distributed in those days in the country, appeals for an uprising against the "bloody tyrant" figured prominently, while the celebration ceremony itself was given such insulting names as "disgraceful farce," "the greatest comedy of the 20th century" and the like. The essence of the problem was the irreconcilable contradictions between the two groups, each of which was struggling for power, employing all possible means, able to provoke their adversary and extract advantage from his smallest error.

The shah and his circle saw this danger, but did not imagine its real dimensions, trusting first of all on the armed forces and the security organs. Ye.A. Doroshenko cites the words of the shah spoken in 1971 in an interview with the newspaper BLITZ: "If the mullahs or somebody else plays an anti-national role, we will simply force them to be silent with a strong hand" (p 180). At the same time, the rulers tried to neutralize the influence of the anti-monarchist propaganda of the clergy by conducting a policy of upper-class reforms which led, however, as noted by the author, basically to an increase in the rift between the rich and the poor, strengthened social contradictions and created a growing subclass of nouveau riche. At the initiative of

monarchist circles, a new attempt was undertaken to oppose the agitation activity of the clergy with their own interpretation of the development of Iranian society, which explained the existence of social contradictions as a "historical necessity." The ideologists of the monarchy affirmed that the problems could be solved "by a strong personality," "by a leader of nations," that is, by the monarch Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (p 190). Strict police monitoring and the repressions of SAVAK practically deprived the opposition of the opportunity of legal existence. Therefore the mosques, medreses, and places of pilgrimage were transformed into a unique form of political club, the more so as according to Shiite tradition they were considered to be immune from secular power.

In gradually bringing the reader toward the revolutionary events of 1978-79, Ye.A. Doroshenko devotes especial attention to research of the religious concepts of the Shiite ideologists on such problems as the theocratic nature of power in the Muslim state, the role of Islam in the life of the individual and society, changes and reforms in Islam, the "third path" of development and "Islamic humanism," as well as the politicizing of the ideological structures of Shiite theoreticians R.M. Khomeini, S.M. Talegani and A. Shariati.

The Iranian revolution introduced changes in the disposition of forces within the clergy. On the one hand, the anti-monarchical and anti-American thrust of Khomeini's struggle and the slogans advanced by him of social and economic transformations met with widespread approval among the people but, on the other hand, the practical activity of the allies of the ayatollah and the transformation of Khomeini into a dictator eliminating "any independence of political institutions in the state" has created opposition to him both among secular and religious figures (p 195).

Nonetheless, the majority of the ayatollahs hastened to declare themselves allies of Khomeini, not only hoping to increase their influence, but also anticipating the sharing of state posts. The ayatollahs Talegani and Shariatmadari occupied a special position. The former openly advocated the return of the clergy to the mosques and the concentration of the forces of religious leaders for the discussion of "disputed issues of faith and complex problems of modern times" (p 196). The latter was against the concentration of power in the hands of Khomeini, considering it as an "actual violation of the sovereignty of the people." He criticized the draft of the new constitution, seeing in it a deviation from judicial norms, and supported demands for the granting of self-determination to Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (pp 198-199). In the end, Khomeini was able to remove both Talegani, who died in 1979, and Shariatmadari, who fell into disfavor in the same year and was stripped of the title of great ayatollah in 1982, from the political arena.

Ye.A. Doroshenko takes her research to the end of 1979, but thanks to the fact that she made a careful analysis of the potential forces of opposition and reviewed in detail the reaction to their activities on the part of the theocratic regime, subsequent events that are chronologically beyond the bounds of the book are not surprising to the reader: the persecution of progressive forces, the massacres of active participants in the revolutionary process and the triumph of the reactionary clergy headed by Khomeini.

The author comes to the conclusion that a "relative stability of theocratic state power" is currently observed, the representatives of which "stand in narrow self-interested corporate positions which eliminate radical social transformations" (pp 207-208). The differences of Khomeini with other eminent religious figures are explained not so much by theoretical distinctions as by a divergence of views on the forms and methods of influencing the masses of laboring Muslims. A common hatred of communism and atheism brings them together.

In no way minimizing the significance of the work of Ye.A. Doroshenko, which is an original and still the sole special research of this type in Soviet Eastern studies, I would like to note several omissions and imprecisions that exist in the monograph.

One cannot agree with the author that the organization Mujahedin-e Khalq "in its nature, goals and tasks is reminiscent... of the religious and terrorist organization Fadayin-e Eslam" (p 187). This affirmation clearly contradicts the program directives and practical activities of the Mujahedin. It also does not correspond with the opinions of the author herself, calling Fadayin-e Eslam "antisocialist," "extreme religious nationalists" and "chauvinists," based on the Lumpenproletariat and the dregs of society (p 100).

As was already indicated above, in its goals the Mujahedin organization was revolutionary and democratic, adopting Marxism as "guidance for action." (Footnote 2) ("Revolutsionnaya demokratiya i kommunisty Vostoka" [Revolutionary Democracy and the Communists of the East]. Moscow, 1984, p 335.) The more so as it is impossible to ascribe such a goal as the struggle against "the influence of the communist world view" to it (p 187). In giving such an opinion, the author possibly had in mind the instance of the sharp speeches of the Mujahedin against the People's Party of Iran [NPI] (Tudeh). The causes of these speeches, however, was not anticommunism, but the non-acknowledgment of the Mujahedin of the claims of the NPI leadership to represent the interests of the laboring masses of Iran, as well as other problems.

The author also in no way proves her assertion that Khomeini has supposedly "established contacts" with the Fadayin and the Mujahedin and "tried to enlist their support" (p 192). From the documents it follows that representatives of the Mujahedin held discussions with Khomeini even before he arrived in exile in Nedjef, but the ayatollah refused to collaborate with them (this was confirmed by the Mujahedin themselves). Khomeini has always had a sharply negative attitude toward the Fadayin as a Marxist organization. The active participation of the members of both organizations in the February uprising of 1979 in no way signifies that this was a consequence of contacts of the imam with the leadership of the Fadayin and Mujahedin--on the contrary, Khomeini tried to come to a compromise with the government of Sh. Bakhtiyari, while the Fadayin and Mujahedin foiled his intention with their actions.

On page 186 the author presents an incorrect treatment of the disparity of the trends in the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, stating that there existed a left wing ("Muslim Progressives") and a "fanatical combat wing," which were

"allies of the Ayatollah Khomeini." In fact, two trends had been defined quite clearly in the organization by 1975, but they were not, however, "left" and "right" (and the more so allies of Khomeini). The fact is that after two major defeats the organizations, when they were practically deprived of their leadership, brought many new people into their central organs who felt that the cause of the failure of the combat operations was the Islamic thrust of the organization's program. Enjoying a numerical superiority in the leadership, they re-oriented the semi-Islamic platform of the organization to a "Marxist" one. As a result of the schism, the "Marxists" were formed into the "Organization of Mujahedin of the Iranian People (Marxist-Leninist Wing)," while the "Islamics" retained the previous name. After the revolution, the "Marxists" renamed themselves the "Organization for Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class" ("Peykar"), uniting several smaller groups with extreme leftist and Maoist inclinations.

In speaking of imprecisions, it is possible to note that the author on page 122 translates the title of a religious tract written by Khomeini in 1942 as "Revealing a Mystery" and on page 156 as "Exposing a Mystery"; errors should be taken note of in the spelling of the names of the leaders of Mujahedin organizations: Khanifand instead of Khanifnejad, Badizegan instead of Badizadegan (p 185) and disparities in the biography of A. Shariati (pp 164-165).

Notwithstanding these imprecisions, however, it can be said that the field of Soviet Eastern studies has been enriched with valuable research on the modern problems of the Muslim East.

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BOOK ON PAKISTAN'S DEMOGRAPHY, LABOR FORCE REVIEWED

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[Review by G.I. Starchenkov of book "Trudovyye resursy Pakistana. Demografno-ekonomicheskiye osnovy formirovaniya" [Labor Resources of Pakistan. Demographic and Economic Bases of Formation] by A.V. Zabolotskiy. Moscow, edited by Eastern Literature of the NAUKA Publishing House, 1985, 248 pages]

[Text] In recent years, the appearance in our country of a whole series of works on the demography of the countries of the East has been noted. Among them are the book under review, which is of interest to specialists in at least two regards. First, this is the first demographic research on Pakistan in domestic literature. Second, a point of view of the problem new to Soviet Eastern demographic studies has been chosen. In fact, in works on a similar theme, demographic questions have been considered closely with either economic development (Footnote 1) (See: A.M. Goryacheva. "Naseleniye i ekonomicheskiy rost v Indii" [The Population and Economic Growth in India]. Moscow, 1983), the problem of employment (Footnote 2) (See: Ye.G. Pozdorovkina. "Trudovyye resursy Alzhirskoy Narodnoy Demokraticheskoy Respubliki" [Labor Resources of the Algerian Democratic Peoples Republic]. Moscow, 1984) or social development (Footnote 3) (See: V.I. Gusarov. "Trudovyye resursy i sotsialnyye problemy Tunisa" [Labor Resources and Social Problems of Tunisia]. Moscow, 1985), while in the book of A.V. Zabolotskiy, principal attention is devoted to the demographic and economic foundations of the formation of labor resources. The author correspondingly researches the dynamics of demographic indicators (births, marriages, deaths, population growth) interconnected with the social and economic conditions of the reproduction of the work force (the level of income for the population, food supply, housing, medical care).

The regional-geographic topicality of the themes hardly needs justification: it is obvious. Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, its population has grown at such a rapid rate that the term "population explosion" does not leave the pages of the scientific works devoted to this country and official publications. Moreover, the government of Pakistan tries to present a considerable portion of the negative phenomena in the life of society (unemployment, the housing crisis, low standard of living etc.) exclusively as the result of rapid population growth.

The source base for the monograph under review is extensive and representative: it includes not only official censuses of the population and the research of Pakistani and foreign scholars, but also a multitude of reports and evaluations by United Nations experts based on field research. The author worked a number of years in various United Nations organizations and had the opportunity of studying the demographic situation in Pakistan right on the spot. He critically reviews the methods of Pakistani, American and British demographers and carefully adjusts the techniques of "double counting," determining the population growth rate, the level of fertility and the like, which allows him to substantiate the optimal variant for research and then demonstrate its effectiveness for specific material. In other words, the theoretical aspects of research are closely linked with specific calculations in the book, which is, in my opinion, its strongest feature. It is also to the merit of the author that he clearly reveals, based on comparing the dynamics of the demographic indicators of Pakistan with the corresponding data for the countries of Asia and Africa, the specific national features of the process of labor-resource formation in this country. He correctly notes, for example, that as a result of the clear divergence of the dynamics of the principal elements of the "material production--population reproduction" system, a "colossal degree of under-utilization of the labor potential of the country" is revealed (p 11). For the future, however, the specific features of Pakistan in this regard are revealed to be inadequate.

A.V. Zabolotskiy devotes especial attention to the fact that the Pakistani woman is extremely poorly involved in social production. The level of economic activity of the female population is only about 2/5 that of the male one. The most serious obstacle on the path of emancipation of women, as stated in the book, is Islam. Under conditions where the regime existing in Pakistan is conducting a reactionary course of the Islamization of social life, the role of the woman as domestic housekeeper called upon only to bear and raise children is reinforced. And "the slow change of family structures and relationships," it is further stated, "makes the beginning of demographic transition more difficult" (p 10).

Exceedingly rapid population growth rate is observed in Pakistan--3 percent a year. A.V. Zabolotskiy agrees with the widely held view that this rate will decline substantially in the more or less long-term historical perspective--"with the development of the urbanization process"--insofar as it is namely in the city "that the evolution of marriage institutions and ideals of reproductive behavior along with the break-up of traditional family structures takes place" (p 47). At the same time, the author cites Pakistani data that do not correspond to this representation. With regard to the process of false urbanization, that is, the growth of cities without their qualitative change and the corresponding development of their industrial base, a reduction in the birth rate is far from always observed. Hence the poor correlation between the proportions of urban population (which appears in the works of Pakistani demographers as the urbanization index) and the dynamics of the birth rate (pp 69-72).

As opposed to the birth rate, the mortality rate--a most important social and economic indicator, a reduction in which is also a cause of the "population explosion"--is inadequately studied in Pakistan. It is interesting to note in

particular that as a consequence of the considerable differentiation of the population by nutrition levels, housing stock, medical care and the like, epidemic diseases today "display a high degree of selectivity, striking for the most part the poor and backward regions" (p 76).

The author conducts an analysis of four variants of the population growth forecast to the year 2000 prepared by United Nations experts based on an extrapolation of birth and mortality rates. He prefers the maximum variant. Apparently, population growth, as noted in the book, will remain high by virtue of "first of all the slow development of the rate of increase of entry into marriage, growth in literacy and employment of the female population" (p 94).

The amount of labor resources is determined not only by population growth, but also by the participation of underage people in social labor. The United Nations has repeatedly undertaken efforts to regulate the use of child labor in international and national legislation. For example, the lower limit of the working age was established at 15 years old. Nonetheless, in Pakistan the population census of 1951 counted people 12 years old, and in the censuses of 1961 and 1972 even 10 years old, as "economically active population" (pp 129, 146). The participation of children and adolescents in the production process, as well as people beyond productive age categories, while expanding the quantitative bounds of labor resources, noticeably worsens the qualitative composition of it.

One of the principal reasons that children must go to work instead of studying in school is the poor standard of living of the majority of the population of the country. According to the definition of the United Nations, by income level per capita Pakistan is among the poor countries. The level of monthly per-capita income provides only for the "survival" of the family, the average size of which is no fewer than 5 people (pp 161, 168). The low income of the population cannot provide the appropriate nourishment, which remains inadequate in both quantitative and qualitative regards. All of this seriously complicates the problem of population reproduction and the formation of labor potential in the country (p 180). The author considers the housing question, as well as the system of education and professional training in Pakistan, from this standpoint.

The work of A.V. Zabolotskiy is not without some shortcomings. The author, citing a multitude of evaluations of various censuses and population polls and the methods and techniques for calculating social and economic indicators, frequently does not offer any other method, and just establishes the insufficient representativeness of the numerical indicators obtained as a result of the censuses or extrapolations. In a number of cases, the author makes interesting calculations, for example the proportion of the economically active population in certain age groups (p 134), comparing the data obtained with the analogous indicators for other years. But he does not summarize his observations, forcing the reader to draw the conclusions.

In my opinion, demographic determinants are not considered sufficiently consistently. Indicators of the levels of birth, marriage, fertility and mortality are considered quite thoroughly, while indicators of the level of

divorce, longevity and the distribution of modern (nuclear) families are presented quite poorly in the book. These indicators, moreover, exist in Pakistani statistics, and with their assistance it would have been possible to describe fully the process of natural population reproduction.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings noted, the work under review presents a quite complete and objective picture of the general and specific features of the process of the formation of labor resources in Pakistan.

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